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Professor Allen Hammond argues that the impending development of
broadband communication networks has the potential to expand and equalize
speech rights by endowing the public with more numerous and more powerful
opportunities for speech. To realize these benefits, however, Congress must
design a novel regulatory scheme that will maximize the speech rights of both
the owners and the users of broadband communication networks. Current
regulatory schemes governing print, broadcast and cable provide media owners
and editors with extensive speech rights, but fail to provide sufficient public
access. In contrast, the regulatory scheme governing telephone service provid-
ers assures public speech rights only by depriving media owners of all opportu-
nities for speech.
This article asserts that the regulatory scheme for broadband communica-
tion networks should be based on the public forum doctrine. Broadband
communication networks with market-based, technology-driven, or government-
sanctioned monopolies should be deemed public fora and required to provide
unrestricted public access. Public forum owners should also retain the right
to generate original programming or "speech" through fully owned subsidiaries.
Other broadband communication networks should be permitted to choose
between public and private forum status.
This novel regulatory scheme would protect the speech rights of media
owners and users, and minimize the threats of private and government censor-
ship inherent in existing regulatory schemes. The author concludes by empha-
sizing that Congress should eschew the licensing of regulated monopolies, and
instead promote unconstrained market entry. At the same time, Professor
Hammond maintains that Congress must establish the incentives needed to
assure that the broadband communication networks of the future are inter-
connected and accessible to the public.
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Introduction
The United States is on the brink of yet another communications revolution.
This time the revolution is precipitated by the merging of computer, telephone,
and fiber optic technologies into broadband communications networks (BCNs).
Each of these technologies contributes critical characteristics which, when
combined, change the manner in which users will communicate. Computer
technology contributes the ability to store, retrieve, manipulate, and control the
flow of information. Telephony networking technology contributes the ability
to engage in interactive communication. Fiber optics technology contributes the
ability to communicate using various types of information integrated over one
transmission path or network. BCN technology ultimately allows for the
replacement of the currently separate information delivery modes of print,
broadcasting/cable, and telephone.
These networks will interconnect many users. Large network providers such
as the telephone companies could provide BCNs that are accessible to the
general public. Single users or groups of private users will likely own BCNs
that connect multiple communications stations in single or multiple locations.
BCNs will also support the high speed transmission of integrated voice, data
and video information in digital form,' which will integrate the transport of
1. By way of comparison, current communications networks involve either analog transmission
(broadcasting and cable television) or a mixture of analog and digital transmission (telephony). Video
information is delivered by broadcasting or cable networks, while voice and data information are delivered
183
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voice, data, and video information and promote two-way interaction between
users.
These two characteristics transform broadband communications technology
into more than the functional sum of the computer, fiber optic, and telephone
technologies and more than an extension of the existing publishing, broadcast-
ing, cable, and telecommunications networks. When BCNs interconnect users, 2
the combined technology will change not only the manner in which information
is used, but also the manner in which information is communicated. The public
will be able to receive, seek out, identify, store, manipulate, compose, alter,
filter, and transmit digitized data, print, video, and voice information, Moreover,
users will be able to select who receives their information.
Electronic communication will no longer be a predominantly passive mode
of interaction conducted via one-way, single-format information streams
controlled by a limited number of senders. Instead, communication will be an
interactive process conducted via two-way, multiple-format information streams
controlled by users of the media. BCNs thus have the potential to shift the locus
of control over communication from the privileged government-sanctioned
media to a greater portion of the public.
Most important, however, this new control will allow individuals and groups
to become electronic speakers and publishers. The ability to determine what
information is received, how it is manipulated, and where it is sent allows the
user to exercise editorial control over his or her multi-media speech. The user's
capacity to send and receive interactively also provides the ability to "assem-
ble" a group electronically. Finally, as the number of speakers increases, the
diversity of available information is likely to increase as well.
BCNs have the potential to expand opportunities for speech and assembly
dramatically. However, with a faulty regulatory scheme, BCNs could further
centralization of control over the means of information transmission. Congress
could decide to vest editorial control in the owner of BCN transmission facili-
ties. Such a statute would severely circumscribe the public's access to the
at varying speeds by telephone and data networks. See generally Robert Mercer, The Technology of
Broadband Networks, in INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETWORKS (Martin Elton et al. eds., 1991).
The current mix of networks has been criticized as inefficient. See BRUCE L. EGAN, INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAYS: THE ECONOMICS OF ADVANCED PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 168 (1991).
2. New "multi-media' devices combining the functions of computers, telephone, and television are
currently being manufactured and tested. For instance, former Apple and NeXT computer employees have
created the Frox computer system. Frox will play CD-ROMs, delete TV commercials, program video cassette
recorders, engage in database searches, and answer the telephone. See George Guilder, Into the Telecosm,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 154.
Ultimately these devices will be capable of storing, manipulating, editing, composing, sending, and
receiving video, voice, data, and stereo sound. See John Burgess, Mixing Up A Revolution? Multi-Media's
High Tech Blend of Sight, Sound May Reshape Information Age, WASH. POST, July 28, 1991, at HI; Paul
Yi, The Mac.''V Connection: Desktop Video, MACUSER, July 1991, at 124.
184
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means of communication and thwart the realization of the potential gain in the
public's speech capacity.
The legislation currently under consideration for regulating BCNs recognizes
the value that broad access to BCNs provides for research, education, and
business. However, while one draft bill acknowledges the potential importance
of broadband networks to the public's speech rights, it does not specify the
status to be accorded the providers of BCN networks or the speech rights of
users. 3 Are the network and facilities providers to be deemed owners with
exclusive speech rights? Do providers and users have speech, access and
assembly rights on the BCNs? To the extent such rights exist, how are they
to be harmonized and protected?
These are not idle questions. In merging various networks and information
streams, BCNs also inherit the system's disparate regulatory schemes for
controlling access and speech. Recent incidents involving personal communica-
tions media and distribution networks illustrate the tendency to apply existing
models to new communication networks.
The federal government's recent seizure of computers and computer bulletin
boards as part of an investigation into computer crimes raised questions about
the First Amendment rights of computer bulletin board owners.' The nature
of subscribers' rights to speak and assemble was also a contested issue when
owners of the Prodigy database service prevented subscribers from using the
system to communicate their protest over rate increases to advertisers and other
subscribers. 5
The First Amendment rights of service providers and users are also at issue
when cable operators modify the access of regional programmers providing
competitive services,6 when telephone common carriers seek to deny access
or billing services to dial-a-porn providers,7 and when telephone common
carriers with a prior history of anti-competitive behavior are granted entry into
enhanced services such as electronic publishing and electronic mail.
3. See S. 1200, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. §101(14) (1991).
4. See Lawrence Edelman, Kapor For The Defense In Computer Field, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11, 1990,
at 33.
5. See Stuart Silverstein, Prodigy Services' Fee Setup Under Probe, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1991, at D2;
Michael Schuyler, Systems Librarian and Automation Review: Rights of Computer On-Line Service Users,
SMALL COMPUTERS IN LIBRARIES, Dec. 1990, at 41; Geoffrey Moore, The First Amendment Is Safe At
Prodigy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, at 3-13; Lawrence Edelman, Is This Man Invading Your Privacy?,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 1990, at 25.
6. See Donna N. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, in CABLE
TELEVISION LEASED ACCESS: A REPORT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATIONS
POLICY STUDIES, 10-12, 15-16 (Northwest U. ed., 1991).
7. For instance, in 1989 the Association of Interactive Information Providers asked the California Public
Utility Commission to reject a Pacific Bell proposal that the carrier be granted the unilateral right to
disconnect any 976 service Pacific Bell believed contained harmful matter. See Communication Daily, June
6, 1989.
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Thus the advent of BCNs will exacerbate current confusion over speech
regulation. Since BCNs combine the functions, technology, and information
transmission of existing media into a single communications medium, they
threaten to obliterate carefully constructed regulatory and barriers between print,
broadcast, cable, and telephony.
Coming at a time of heightened concern about international competition
with Japan and Europe, rapid implementation of broadband technology may
have competitive advantages. However, industry debates have focused on the
financing of fiber's implementation and the maintenance of the United States'
competitive edge in the international arena. By doing so, these debates obscure
the unique value broadband technology has for freeing the flow of information,
and ignore the free speech questions BCNs' integrative characteristics will
produce.8
Congress and the FCC should defer decisions regarding the ownership and
regulation of BCNs because these decisions implicitly apportion speech rights
in society. Before regulating BCNs, they should identify the speech rights
broadband could bestow on our society and devise a scheme for protecting
these rights. Further, Congress and the FCC should consider the impact their
regulations will have on the speech rights of broadband network providers and
their users.
In order to protect these rights, Congress and the FCC must confront and
resolve the conflict between competing interpretations of the First Amendment.
According to one interpretation, the First Amendment protects only the owner's
individual liberty to speak. In contrast, the social equality interpretation views
the First Amendment as enhancing the public's access to the means of trans-
mission.
This article begins to identify BCNs' potential for expanding user speech,
access, and assembly rights and concludes that such rights are protected by the
First Amendment. The article proceeds to question the appropriateness of
applying the current regulatory models of print, broadcast and cable, or com-
mon carriage to protect the panoply of speech rights created by BCNs, and
concludes that broadband technology demands a new regulatory scheme.
The article also assesses the utility of four theoretical models for regulating
communication media. These models include the marketplace regulation model
and models assigning speech rights by dedicating specific transmission paths
(channel functionalism) or distribution networks (media functionalism) to
particular types of information (print, video, voice, or data), or by separating
8. The Senate version of the Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act
does acknowledge the potential free speech benefits of an extensive fiber-optic broadband infrastructure.
By contrast, the House companion bill, H.R. 2546, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991), does not contain a similar
provision in its findings. See S. 1200, supra note 3.
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transmission functions from speech functions (operational functionalism). The
article concludes that these proposals are no more viable than the existing
regulatory models for print, broadcast and cable, or common carriage from
which the theoretical models evolved.
The article concludes by proposing a possible resolution of the constitutional
dispute over the regulation of speech. The resolution favors a model in which
public and private communication forums coexist. Recognizing a distinction
between public and private forums will protect the First Amendment rights of
both the providers and the users while limiting the potential for government
and private censorship.
The proposed regulatory model would allow BCN firms to become private
or public forums depending on the extent of responsibility and liability for
owner and user initiated speech that the firms are willing to assume. Those
firms allowing relatively unrestricted access would assume little or no responsi-
bility for the content of transmission. BCN firms seeking status as private fora
would assume significant liability for the content of transmission. Finally, the
proposed regulatory model would require firms enjoying technical, economic
or government monopolies to provide common carrier services but would not
preclude these firms from providing content-related services via an arms length
subsidiary. Upon the loss of their monopoly, such firms would have the option
to choose private or public forum status. This model would endow both BCN
owners and users with meaningful speech rights.
I. The Promise of Broadband
A. Technological Synthesis and Information Abundance
According to industry commentators, the previously deferred promise and
potential of broadband communications is upon us. Various marketing tests
ofIntegrated Services Digital Network9 and Broadband" services are under-
9. ISDN allows users to send voice, data, and images over a single, high capacity telephone line. ISDN
will allow a single call simultaneously to handle voice and document (facsimile, text and graphics)
interactive transmissions. Several local exchange carriers (LECs) began providing ISDN in late 1988. See
Bruce Keppel, Testing a New Fiber-Optic Link to the Future, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at DI; see also
Stephen Weinstein & Paul Shumate, Beyond the Telephone: New Ways to Communicate, THE FUTURIST,
Nov, 1989, at 8.
10. Broadband communications networks, sometimes called Broadband Integrated Services Digital
Networks [hereinafter BISDN], which rely on fiber optic cables, possess a wider bandwidth and more
capacity than ISDN's copper cables. BISDN can offer "simultaneous extended-quality, on-demand video
services, interpersonal communications, and high speed data and image communication among fax machines,
work stations, and computers" as well as "basic telephone and telemetry services (e.g., home security alarms,
utility monitoring, etc.)." Weinstein & Shumate, supra note 9, at 8.
Fiber-to-home trials are being conducted in 20 sites nationwide (including Cerritos, California;
Ridgecrest, California; Heathrow, Florida; Perryopolis, Pennsylvania, and Princeton Gate, New Jersey) and
in Britain, Canada, and Japan to determine customer interest. See Keppel, supra note 9, at DI, D6. See also
187
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way." As these tests progress, the list of available and potential residential
and business services lengthens. These services include not only the traditional
interactive voice, 2 data, and passive video services13 that are already gener-
ally available, but also more interactive services such as home banking, home
shopping, alarm and utility monitoring, climate control, pay per view, video-on-
demand, two-way video, picture phones, computer assisted research, work at
home, electronic voting and videotext. 4
Many of these interactive services are currently accessible through narrow-
band technology to individuals with a computer and a modem. Through their
computers, and sometimes, with gateways provided by the telephone com-
pany, 5 users can travel the public switched telephone network and enter thou-
sands of publicly accessible computer bulletin boards and on-line data serv-
ices. 16 Similarly, many users bank electronically using touch-tone phones or
computer modems. 7 Finally, using the telephone network and the cable sys-
tem, some cable subscribers are able to interact with computers at the cable
operator's headend to order pay per view programming. 18
This, however, is but a small piece of broadband's promise and potential.
Users currently communicating over bulletin boards and on-line services or
banking electronically are relying on a single, albeit flexible, telephone network
for data transmission. Most cable subscribers must still use two independent
networks, the telephone for data communication to the computer and the cable
Dawn Bushaus & Deborah Pfeiffer, Fiber to the Home: A Family Affair, TELEPHONY, Nov. 27, 1989, at
S27; John Markoff, Here Comes the Fiber-Optic Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1989, § 3, at 1; John Burgess,
Wire War: Putting America on Line, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1989, at C3; Cliff Probst, The Last Mile In Fiber
City, TELECOMM. ENGINEERING & MOMT., Feb. 15, 1988, at 39,
11. For an explanation of the myriad services that may be provided to the home, see STEPHEN
WEINSTEIN, GETTINO THE PICTURE 86-87 (1986). See also Keppel, supra note 9, at D1; Weinstein &
Shumate, supra note 9, at 8; Probst, supra note 10, at 39.
12. Two-way interactive voice and data includes "plain old telephone service" [hereinafter POTS] and
other current telephony services for voice and data.
13. Passive electronic video services are characterized by one-way transmission to viewers. These
services include television broadcasting, cable television, and video services provided over the new electronic
video technologies such as Direct Broadcast Satellites, Satellite Master Antenna Television Service,
Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service, Instructional Television Fixed Service and Operational Fixed
Service. For a definition of the technologies, see Allen Hammond, To Be or Not To Be: FCC Regulation
of Video Subscription Technologies, 35 CAm. U. L. REV. 737, 741-48 (1986). See also DANIEL BRENNER
ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NON-BROADCAST VIDEO, §§ 13-1 to 16-35 (1989).
14. See Hammond, supra note, 13; BRENNER, supra note 13.
15. A gateway is usually a local phone number available for modem owners to dial, a list of informa-
tion providers and several help screens. See David Margulius, Videotex Redux: The Current State of the
Videotex Market, PC-COMPuTINo, Jan. 1989, at 190.
16. See Edelman, supra note 4.
17. Nevertheless, some commentators have declared banking by phone to be a "dismal" failure. See
Kinsey Wilson, The Day When Computing and Communication Are Integrated As One May Be Closer Than
Most People Think, NEWSDAY, Oct. 16, 1990, at 1.
18. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 81-82.
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system for video communication from the cable operator, to engage in interac-
tive communication.
In contrast, when BCNs unite the functions of publishing, broadcast, cable
and telecommunications network delivery systems and combine the information
formats of print, voice, video, and data, users will be able to conduct all of
these activities on a single network in a multi-informational format. Moreover,
they will be able to engage in activities requiring greater speeds and capacities
than the current telephone, cable, or spectrum-based networks provide.
The provision of these new multi-media services through a single network
is based on computer technology and fiber optic technology. An optical fiber
is a strand of flexible, hair thin glass approximately 0.005 inches in diameter. 9
These glass fibers carry pulses of laser-generated light. Compared to copper
cables currently used for voice and data transmission, fiber optic cables are
impervious to electrical interference and can ultimately carry digitized bit
streams at the speed of light, hundreds of thousands of times faster than
transmission via copper.' When combined in multi-fiber trunks, optical fibers
have virtually unlimited capacity to carry voice, video and data simultane-
ously.2' Because of its capacity, fiber optics allows two-way interactive com-
munication via video as well as voice and data.
22
Through the use of broadband networks, users will be able to send pictures
to someone thousands of miles away, and the images will be as sharp and clear
as a photograph of the original object.23 Written messages could be converted
into voice for delivery to individuals in cars, while hearing impaired individuals
could use speech-generated text to converse with others by phone? A surgeon
in one city could obtain advice from a colleague, while watching an operation
transmitted over the network, as if he were in the operating room.25
A new generation of multi-media communications devices will combine the
functions of television, computers and telephone. 2 It is predicted that the
devices will "process many different forms of information, combining voice,
video, data, news, education, sports, film, and photos in one interactive digital
stream."'27 With these devices appended to BCNs, users would be able to talk
face to face, explore potential vacation spots or plot future travel itineraries,
19. See Keppel, supra note 9, at D6; Burgess, supra note 2.
20. See Keppel, supra note 9, at D6. See also Markoff, supra note 10.
21. See Sidney Dean, Jr. & Robert Shayon, AT&T and Fiber Optics: Grabbing an Electronic Bonanza,
THE NATION, Oct. 9, 1989, at 386.
22. See Keppel, supra note 9, at D6.
23. See Weinstein & Shumate, supra note 9, at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Gilder, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
27. Gilder, supra note 2, at 151.
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and search out and retrieve audio visual information and full-motion video all
on one device situated in their living room.
28
The advent of such communication devices and broadband communications
networks will expand the speech opportunities for business and personal users.
As the number of users grows, the network will increasingly resemble a vast
forum in which users speak, debate, and assemble.
B. The Utility and Social Impact of Interactive Broadband Technology:
Altering the Distribution of Information and the Social Structure of Society
[T]he use of a new medium of communication alters the distribution of
information in a society and, as a consequence, its social structure.29
Computer-augmented broadband services change the manner in which
consumers use information and the manner in which consumers communicate
with one another. These services increase the number of individuals who can
initiate electronic speech and the number of fora available for public assembly.
Users not only participate in communications addressed to them, they also
initiate communication to others. As a result, groups .can communicate in a
manner previously available only through face to face meetings.3"
Use of interactive broadband technology and computers will also increase
the value of the information individuals receive.3 Users will be able to tailor
the information they receive to their own needs and preferences. Searches of
video or print data bases will not necessarily be limited to what a videocaster
or print editor decides to videocast or publish, and the information received will
only include information that was requested.32
As information usage becomes more individualized, consumers may become
less tied to the larger community. Consumers within a particular group, class,
race, industry or religious sect can have their own programs, mini networks,
28. Id.
29. M. Ethan Katsh, Cominunications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The New Media and the
Future of Law, 8 NOVA L. REV. 631, 639 (1984) (citing a major thesis in the writings of Harold Adams
Innis). See HAROLD A. INNIS, EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS (1950); HAROLD A. INNIS, THE BIAS OF
COMMUNICATION (1951).
30. See Katsh, supra note 29, at 662-63; Francis Dummer Fisher, Free Speech and High Tech, 82
MICH. L. REV. 981, 982-83 (1984). See also STARR R. HILTz & MURRAY TUROFF, THE NETWORK NATION:
HUMAN COMMUNICATION VIA COMPUTER (1978).
31. Fisher, supra note 30, at 982.
32. For instance, an interactive cable television system in Montreal, Canada allows the viewer to interact
with the programming. At the touch of a button a viewer can decide which news stories provided in the
newscast he or she wishes to view. A sports enthusiast can switch camera shots or call up instant replays
of a play in a game. See Martin Wroe, Media: Heaven for A Couch Potato, THE INDEPENDENT, May 23,
1990, at 19.
190
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and data bases specifically designed to meet their needs, beliefs, and inter-
ests.33 As a consequence, consumers will be better able to preclude the receipt
of conflicting or differing points of view.34
This "balkanization" impact could be compounded if a significant portion
of the public is denied access to broadband services because they lack
wealth.35 In such circumstances, broadband communications could augment
the economic fragmentation of the public produced by the unequal distribution
of wealth.36 In this context, the usage patterns could have divisive effects on
the democratic political process in the United States. 37
By changing the manner in which information is used and communicated
by individuals, computer-augmented interactive broadband technology will
create opportunities for the development of new First Amendment rights for
individuals. However, these gains will only be realized if individuals are
assured relatively easy access to a public, switched, integrated broadband
network. Using the regulatory schemes currently employed to govern print,
video, or voice communication to regulate broadband would deny BCN owners
and users the potential benefits of broadband technology. None of these regula-
tory schemes could adequately balance and protect the competing First Amend-
ment rights of BCN owners and the public.
C. Expression the First Amendment Was Meant To Protect
The courts and first amendment scholars have identified at least four
interrelated speech rights in the first amendment: self-expression, assembly,
access, and diverse points of view. These speech rights further a variety of
social purposes and values including individual self-expression,38 the attain-
33. M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 103 (1989).
See also Benjamin Barber, The Second American Revolution, CHANNELS, Feb./Mar. 1981, at 21.
34. At least one First Amendment scholar argues that "there is significant benefit in being exposed
to ideas and attitudes different from one's own, though this exposure be unwelcome. If we had complete
control over the expression we are exposed to, the chances are high that we would use this power to our
detriment." Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, in FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION: A COLLECTION OF BEST WRrrINGS 471, 478 (Kent Middleton & Roy M. Mersky eds.,
1981). But see JEFFERY B. ABRAMSON, ET AL., THE ELECTRONIC COMMONWEALTH: THE IMPACT OF NEW
MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES ON DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 278 (1988).
35. "The critical problem for contemporary First Amendment theory is the unequal access that wealth
can buy. Through its guaranty of free expression, the First Amendment supposedly protects the right of each
individual to communicate his or her ideas. But as the Supreme Court recognized a few years ago, 'virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money."' Stephen
Carter, Technology, Democracy and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581 (1984) (book review)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)).
36. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY, 176-80 (1990).
37. See ABRAMSON, supra note 34, at 160-61.
38. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978). The Supreme Court
emphasized that an individual's interest in self-expression is a separate First Amendment concern from that
of an open and informed discussion.
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ment of truth,39 assuring participatory self-governance by consensus,' and
maintaining the balance between stability and change in society."' The
Supreme Court has enumerated a broad set of subject areas protected by the
First Amendment, including expression of philosophical, social, artistic, eco-
nomic, literary, ethical, and political matters.42
Freedom of self-expression has been defined as the interest of each individ-
ual in deciding what views to express43 and in having the ability to call some-
thing to the attention of an audience." As many scholars have recognized,
individuals using computer augmented interactive broadband communications
have the capability to become their own publishers. 5 They will have increas-
ing control over an expanding body of information and the tools to use and
mold that information into their own unique viewpoints.
Moreover, because of the broad access afforded by the public switched
network and because of the predicted increases in shared-use databases, individ-
uals will have the means to call information to the attention of a far greater
portion of the public. Telephone ("the poor man's transmitter"46) will become,
with the use of a computer and the broadband network, a more powerful
transmission tool capable of turning private conversations into public
discourses .
47
Realization of one's right of self-expression often depends upon the ability
to assemble and to communicate with others in public fora. Public fora are
"natural locations for those seeking to reach potential listeners."" The
interactive broadband network will provide many opportunities for the creation
of public fora as users and providers are aggregated by interest.
The public also has a right to receive competing viewpoints. The Supreme
Court and many scholars perceive this public right as essential to successful
self-government and social stability.49 The more open and accessible the
network, the greater the opportunity individuals will have to receive diverse
information. 50
39. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
40. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmatic Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795 (1981).
41. See generally, THOMAS 1. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1966).
42. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
43. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtIONAL LAW 788 (1988) (citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
44. See Scanlon, supra note 34, at 475.
45. See, e.g., ITIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 250-51 (1983).
46. Carter, supra note 35, at 599 n.93.
47. See Katsh, supra note 29, at 639-41.
48. Emerson, supra note 40, at 807-08.
49. See EMERSON, supra note 41, at 11-15. See also Abrams v. United Stales, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50. See generally Katsh, supra note 29.
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Rights of speech, assembly, access and diversity naturally flow from the
use of broadband technology. The manner in which the technology is regulated,
however, changes the availability of speech rights. Non-discriminatory access
to an interactive broadband network would enhance individual speech rights,
while restricted access could reduce rights significantly.
If the benefits of the broadband infrastructure are to be realized, public and
private actors must make the system's construction a priority. However, the
transition from separate technology and information-specific networks to an
integrated broadband network infrastructure will be complicated and controver-
sial, requiring the resolution of multiple political and regulatory conflicts.
II. Holding Market and Regulatory Lines Against A "Sandstorm of
Silicon" 5'
A. Public Policies and Private Interests
Presently, significant controversy has emerged in Congress, the courts, and
the FCC about when and how the United States will receive the benefits of
broadband communications networks. Imbedded within the larger controversy
are several smaller interrelated discussions about the efficacy, timing, and locus
of responsibility for stringing fiber optic cable to the home, and the advisability
of allowing the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to enter the
enhanced and information services markets.
1. Interested Parties and Stakeholders
Broadly defined, the groups interested in the debate include users of the
currently separate information distribution networks, providers of public and
private telecommunications facilities and services, resellers of network services,
businesses which rely on network services to produce goods and services, and
suppliers of the equipment required to develop and maintain a broadband
network.
Users are individuals, firms, or groups having no ownership of the networks
and services they use, They may purchase access to some of the networks over
which they interact, such as the telephone network. They are most often semi-
passive recipients of information transmitted one-way over broadcast or cable
networks. In short, they are customer-users. The communications needs of
business and residential customer-users vary substantially. For instance, many
businesses already have significant needs for high-speed, high-capacity broad-
51. Peter Huber, Telecom Apartheid, FoRBES, Nov. 27, 1989, at 268.
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band communication networks.52 By comparison, the general public has not
yet generated needs sufficient to precipitate demand for greater network speeds
and capacities.53 Public network providers own most of the telecommunica-
tions network switching and transmission facilities which are part of the public
switched network. They are essentially common carriers by their own election
(MCI and Sprint) or by regulation (AT&T and the RBOCs). Private network
providers also own switching and transmission facilities. They are intercon-
nected with the public switched network and sometimes lease capacity from
public network providers. Private network providers are essentially private
carriers switching and transporting information for specific customers. 54
2. Infrastructure, Public Policy, and "Wiring the Last Mile"
Currently, members of Congress and the administration, futurists, technolo-
gists, and scholars extoll the importance and virtues of a national broadband
infrastructure. These parties perceive a broadband infrastructure as critical to
education, medical care for the elderly, economic development, international
competition, scientific research, and competition with cable television serv-
ices.55 The parties are also pursuing the political, social, and economic benefits
expected to flow to those who provide the new and enhanced services.56
Some argue that unless a national broadband infrastructure is developed,
access to new services will be limited to a small portion of the public. 57 The
importance of a national broadband infrastructure can be compared to the
critical role that the national highway system and the electrical power distribu-
tion network have played in linking our society. With a national broadband
infrastructure in place, most members of society would be electronically
accessible to one another.5"
For others, rewiring tie nation with fiber is a national priority because it
is essential to maintaining American competitiveness at home and abroad. In
the face of increasing international competition, the infrastructure is necessary
to assure the preeminence of the United States as an international and domestic
52. See Michael L. Dertouzos, Communications, Computers and Networks, Sci. Am., Sept. 1991, at
64 [hereinafter Dertouzos, Communications, Computers and Networks]; Albert Gore, Infrastructure for the
Global Village, Sci. Am., Sept. 1991, at 152; Michael L. Dertouzos, Building the Information Marketplace,
94 TECH. REv. 28, 31-32 (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter Dertouzos, Building the Information Marketplace].
53. Dertouzos, Building the Information Marketplace, supra note 52, at 3 1-32; Dertouzos, Computers,
Communications and Networks, supra note 52, at 65.
54. There are an estimated 700,000 private networks in the United States. See Guilder, supra note 2,
at 160.
55. See S. 1220, supra note 3, at §101; H.R. 2546, supra note 8, at §101.
56. See Gore, supra note 52, at 152-53; Nicholas P. Negroponte, Products and Services for Computer
Networks, Sc1. AM., Sept. 1991, at 108-09.
57. See, e.g., Gore, supra note 52, at 152.
58. See S. 1200 supra note 3, at § 101(12).
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telecommunications services and equipment provider. These scholars claim that
the failure to move swiftly to wire the nation with broadband fiber technology
would invite foreign firms to take the lead in network installation and the
provision of innovative services.59 This potential for foreign competition may
be detrimental to the development of domestic industries, employment opportu-
nities, and the nation's balance of trade. For example, the regional telephone
companies argue that if they are allowed to finance fiber rewiring via entry into
the video distribution and electronic services markets, their exports could help
cut the United States trade deficit, and their research could bolster the United
States' position as a leader in telecommunication technology.60
Much of the long distance infrastructure of the public telecommunications
network is wired with fiber. There is still disagreement, however, over who will
wire and digitize the local and regional markets and how much it will cost.6
One commentator argues that "stringing the fiber the 'last mile' to each home
will have to wait until enough video and other consumer services requiring high
transmission speeds emerge to pay for it."62 Basic interactive services are
already offered over copper for less money,63 and there is not sufficient
demand for other services. The uncertain demand for new services means that
telephone companies would likely finance rewiring with revenues from existing
telephone services.64 Others argue just as strenuously that financing the devel-
opment of a broadband infrastructure is not problematic. The price of fiber
deployment will plummet within seven years as the cost of fiber optic cable
production decreases to one tenth its current level and regulations "preventing"
the RBOCs from laying fiber to homes are removed.65
This debate should not obscure the clarity of the administration's position
favoring open market competition. The Congress is presently considering bills
in both houses which would establish the creation of a broadband communica-
59. For instance, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph is reported to be planning to spend an estimated
$200 billion dollars on a new fiber-based network in Japan. See Gore, supra note 52, at 152; Burgess, supra
note 10, at C3. See also Markoff, supra note 10, § 3, at 1.
60. See Mark Lewyn, Will Congress Set the 'Bell Seven' Free?, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 4, 1989, at 110.
61. The cost of substituting fiber for the existing copper telephone network which connects the nation's
90 million homes is estimated at $200 billion dollars. Markoff, supra note 10, at § 3, at 1. Currently,
"equipping a home for the full video, voice and computer services that are foreseen would run $5,000-
$10,000..." Burgess, supra note 10, at C3. The cost of wiring a home with copper is approximately
$1,500. Markoff, supra note 10, at § 3, at 1. At present, fiber remains conservatively three to seven or as
much as ten to twenty times more costly to install than coaxial cable. See Fiber Gets Closer to Home, BROADCAST-
wo, Oct. 16,1989, at 34. Prices for fiber installation could fall over the next decade to approximately $1,800
per home. Burgess, supra note 10, at C3.
62. See Burgess, supra note 10.
63. See Mark Cooper, Expanding the Information Age for the 1990's: A Pragmatic Consumer Analysis,
prepared for The American Association of Retired Persons and The Consumer Federation of America ES-1,
ES-2, 18-21 (Jan. 11, 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
64. See Bushaus & Pfeiffer, supra note 10, at S27.
65. Guilder also suggests that when maintenance costs are included in the calculations, fiber is already
as cheap as the coaxial cable used in telephony and cable transmission. See Guilder, supra note 2, at 156.
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tions infrastructure as a national goal.66 The District of Columbia district court
has approved limited RBOC entry into the information and enhanced services
markets.67 Meanwhile, the FCC has issued a notice of inquiry to initiate its
consideration of the removal of current cross-ownership restrictions on the co-
ownership of telephone and cable facilities. 68 Thus, the entry of the RBOCs
into the video and information services markets to compete with publishing,
broadcasting and cable television companies is imminent. The only remaining
issues are whether the RBOCs will ultimately be allowed to provide video
services in their respective geographic telephone markets, 69 and how the
interests of RBOCs will be reconciled with the interests of each of the current
information distribution industries.
B. Entry Into the Broadband Marketplace: The Coming Competition In
Multi-Media Information Distribution
The use of broadband technology has begun to erode the market protection
previously enjoyed by the traditional information distribution industries. Further,
as the technology and information-related distinctions vanish, regulatory
protection of the distinct markets no longer makes sense. The removal of these
protections will increase opportunities for market entry. Consequently, each
industry has a significant stake in controlling the development, deployment, and
use of broadband technology.
The RBOCs seek to expand into the interactive video and electronic pub-
lishing markets while protecting their voice and data markets. The print,
broadcast, and cable television industries seek to protect their respective markets
by opposing the entry of the RBOCs.70 At least two of the current information
distribution industries will attempt to garner competitive advantage by becoming
broadband transmission providers. They may also attempt to influence the
manner in which broadband technology will be regulated.
The telephone and cable television industries have the most immediate
interest in controlling attempts to rewire the residential market. At present, the
66. The language in both bills would amend section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C.
§ 151, by adding the following language after "at reasonable charges": "for the purpose of establishing a
nationwide, advanced, interactive, interoperable, broadband communications system available to all people,
businesses, services, organizations and households on or before the year 2015." See S.1200, supra note 3,
at § 102; H.R. 2546, supra note 8, at § 102.
67. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom., Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). See also Tawn Parent, Forbidden Fruit No More? Phone Companies Gear
Up for Possible Entry Into Cable TV, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., July 16, 1990, § 2, at 18.
68. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-63.58 (1989).
69. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59 (1987).
70. They have opposed legislation allowing the entry of telephone companies into the video distribution
market. See Lewyn, supra note 60; See also Harry Jessel, Appeals Court Says FCC Erred in Cerritos
Waiver, BROADCASTINo, Sept. 24, 1990, at 28.
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networks of each industry connect with equipment on the premises of their
users' homes. A technology which would allow one set of wires to deliver the
voice and data information currently provided via telephony and the video
information provided by cable is of great economic concern to both. It is not
surprising that each industry takes radically different positions on rewiring the
home.
The RBOCs argue that allowing them to enter the electronic video distribu-
tion and information services markets would provide the economic incentive
for earlier wiring of fiber to the home. Cable companies argue that they are
currently modernizing their networks consistent with consumer demand, and
that the demand for new video and information services is far less than the
RBOCs have predicted. They further contend that regional telephone companies
would engage in anti-competitive behavior if allowed to enter the video distri-
bution market. The history of pole attachment litigation between cable television
firms and regional telephone companies lends credence to cable operator
concerns.
7 1
Cable companies are not alone in condemning telephone entry into the video
and print information distribution markets.72 Newspaper publishers are con-
cerned that tleir classified and retail advertising base will be lured onto com-
puter based information services provided by the RBOCs. 73 Long distance
phone companies worry that allowing the RBOCs into the video and electronic
information markets will lead to RBOC entry into the long distance telephone
market.74
Broadcasters, already hard pressed by multi-channel cable and microwave
systems and the specter of high definition television, are wary of seeing yet
another powerful multi-channel competitor enter the video distribution mar-
ket.7 Their recent experiences in attempting to gain-access to cable television
channels, the telephone companies' history of anti-competitive behavior, and
more recent RBOC indiscretions fuel concerns.76
71. See generally BRENNER, supra note 13, at § 5.02(1)-(5), §§ 5-4 to 5-18.
72. Cable television companies and newspaper publishers as well as long distance companies and
electronic equipment manufacturers allege that the RBOCs would use their revenues to compete unfairly.
See, e.g., Two Groups Rip Cable Role For Phone Firms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1990, at D5.
73. One of the first services the RBOCs are likely to market will be an electronic version of the yellow
pages. See Carla Lazzareschi, Information Revolution Is Likely to be Years Away, L.A. TIMES, July 27,
1991, at Al. This service could erode the newspapers' hold on the $12.8 billion dollar classified advertising
market. See Henry Gilgoff, Dialing for Data: Ruling Lets 'Baby Bells' Compete in Info Services, NEWSDAY,
July 26, 1991, at 5; cf. Christy Fisher, Bell Ruling Rings Alarm: ANPA Gets Ready to Fight Against New
Phone Services, ADVERTISING AGE, July 29, 1991, at 1.
74. See Gilgoff, supra note 73.
75. See Kim McAvoy, Cable and Broadcasters Find Common Ground; Broadcasting/Cable Interface
V Conference, BROADCASTING, June 10, 1991, at 39.
76. See United States v. Western Electric Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991). See also Edmund
Andrews, 'Baby Bells' Wait; Hope Judge Relents, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1991, §3, at 5; Steve Effros, Will
Users Benefit from Telco Entry into the Cable Industry?, NETWORK WORLD, July 30, 1990, at 31.
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Like the broadcasters, some providers of computer-based on-line information
and other services also are concerned about RBOC attempts to limit access. 7
Finally, electronic equipment manufacturers warn that the regional telephone
companies would use revenues to compete unfairly. 78
C. "A Regulatory Nightmare in the Making"
79
Given the regulatory baggage each industry brings to broadband service
competition, debates over how to render such competition "fair" necessarily
will include a determination of which regulations, if any, ought to be employed
in the evolving broadband services market. The danger in such a debate is that
policy may be formulated on economic considerations with little attention to
the policy's effect on the speech rights of broadband providers and consumers.
This tendency to ignore speech rights may be heightened because a significant
portion of the broadband services have yet to be developed.
Historically, market entry and technological considerations have shaped the
distribution of the First Amendment rights between media providers and the
public. Media owners in each industry have been accorded First Amendment
rights based in part on the ease of entry into each market.
In print, speech was unregulated because it was assumed that anyone could
publish. There was no perceived need for the government to assure access.80
The initial scarcity of broadcast frequencies made acquisition of the means
of transmission more problematic. All those who sought to broadcast could not
do so without substantial signal interference, so the government licensed only
a few broadcasters. However, by requiring the broadcast licensee to share his
or her frequency with the public, government regulation sought to reduce the
impact of the broadcasters' control over the channel of communication."'
Similarly, cable television franchises were scarce because of the physical
limits inherent in the use of public rights of way. The economies of scale
exacerbated this physical scarcity. Because all who sought to cablecast could
77. See COMM. DAILY, June 6, 1989, at 7 (reporting on request that the California Public Utility
Commission reject an RBOC proposal that it be allowed the discretion to disconnect any service provider
or 976 service program which the RBOC determined contained harmful matter).
78. See id.
79. Regulating the Future: How Existing and Emerging Technologies Will Be Regulated is Topic of
Debate at FCBA Forum, BROADCASTING, Oct. 30, 1989, at 58 (quoting FCC Commissioner Sherrie
Marshall).
80. This perception of the ease of entry into the print market no longer holds sway. However, its loss
of credibility has not resulted in the imposition of access requirements on newspaper publishers. See Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding that government regulation that intrudes
on the editorial control of a newspaper violates the First Amendment).
81. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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not do so, the cable franchisee was required to share his or her channels of
communication with the public.8 2
In telephony, the need for interconnection and economies of scale led to
the creation of government-sanctioned monopolies. Government then sought
to assure public access by prohibiting discrimination between customers on the
basis of facilities or the price paid for the services provided. As a further means
of preventing discrimination, regulations deprived the telephone company of
any control over the content of the information transmitted.
There is a critical relationship between regulatory policy assumptions
regarding market entry and competition and the scope of First Amendment
rights afforded media owners. Therefore, any regulation of market entry and
competition in broadband should include explicit recognition of its impact on
the First Amendment rights of broadband providers and consumers.
Since the lines between publishing, broadcasting and the telephone
network are now being broken, the question arises as to which of these
three models will dominate public policy regarding the new media.
There is bound to be debate with sharp divisions between conflicting
interests.83
The evolving regulatory "nightmare" provides the Congress, the FCC, and the
courts with an opportunity to eschew the piecemeal approach to communi-
cations policy, and instead base regulation on the underlying First Amendment
premises of communications and telecommunications.
D. A Question of Balance
The timing of the regulatory debate over BCNs is particularly propitious,
because of the likelihood that the RBOCs will be allowed entry into the
information services markets. Congress, the FCC, and the courts should decide
whether the RBOCs and other networks have First Amendment speech rights.
Further, these bodies must determine what access rights the competitors of the
broadband networks should enjoy. Should access requirements restrict broad-
band like the regulations limiting cable television? Are such requirements a
contravention of the broadband network provider's First Amendment rights?
How should the First Amendment rights of users be balanced with the rights
82. See The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532 (1987) (discussing public access channels and leased commercial
access channels)).
83. POOL, supra note 45, at 250-51.
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of companies which develop, deploy, and operate interactive broadband net-
works?
Broadband regulation and the balancing of speech rights should not be
based on traditional models of regulation. Neither should broadband's similari-
ties to its predecessors determine the form of regulation. Rather, regulators
should examine how the technology will be used, whether these uses are
protected by the First Amendment, and what control parties should have over
the usage rights of others.
III. Applying an Eighteenth Century First Amendment to a Twenty-First
Century Technology"
The access afforded by communication technology has traditionally shaped
regulation. Since there are supposedly few economic barriers to entry in print,
regulation has been sparse. The newspaper owner enjoys almost complete
freedom of speech while the public enjoys no right to access.
In broadcast or cable television, spectrum or franchise scarcity limits market
entry, and so regulation tries to assure some public access. Broadcasters, for
instance, must allow access to political candidates, and cablecasters of a certain
size must set aside channels for public or commercial use. Entry into the
common carrier market is economically difficult, and so regulators have limited
common carriers' speech rights.
The courts have contributed to these models: "applying familiar analogies
from the past to their lay image of the new technology, [the judiciary] create[s]
a partly old, partly new structure of rights and obligations."85 For instance,
the courts have compared and distinguished broadcasting and print;86 cable
television and print and broadcasting; 87 and direct broadcast satellites and
video subscription and print, broadcasting, and common carriage.88 The courts
would likely compare broadband distribution networks to print, broadcasting,
cable, and common carriage and regulate BCNs based on an amalgamation of
previous regulatory models.
This "common law" mode of judicial analysis has come under increasing
criticism. Some commentators argue that the premise that different media
necessarily invite different allocations of First Amendment rights between
84. See Fisher, supra note 30, at 981.
85. POOL, supra note 45, at 7.
86. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
87. See Michael Wirth & Linda Cobb-Reilly, A First Amendment Critique of the 1984 Cable Act, J.
BROADCASTING & ELECT. MEDIA, Fall 1987, at 396-99.
88. See Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Nat'l Ass'n for Better
Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (distinguishing subscription Television Service from
conventional broadcasting). This case served as the basis for the FCC to distinguish new video subscription
technologies such as multichannel multipoint distribution service from broadcasting.
Vol. 9: 181, 1992
HeinOnline  -- 9 Yale J. on Reg. 200 1992
Broadband Communication Networks
private owner and public speakers rests on a flawed interpretation of the First
Amendment. They believe that this premise sanctions government regulation
of mass media in a manner contrary to the First Amendment's prohibition
against government regulation of speech. 9 Moreover, technological, physical,
or economic scarcity, the primary justification for much of government regula-
tion of electronic mass media, is diminishing as technology creates more
potential media outlets.9° However, interpretations of the First Amendment
which emphasize the "private liberty" or print model fail to acknowledge the
notion of equality prevalent in American political philosophy. Moreover,
proponents of the "private liberty" model rely on flawed assumptions regarding
the marketplace of ideas.
Other critics argue that these regulatory models tend to be inappropriate to
emerging forms of the technology. For instance, broadband technology has the
capacity to facilitate interactive communication between individuals irrespective
of the type of information transmitted. Also, it combines distinct information
streams and technology into one network or channel. As discussed below, these
characteristics set broadband apart from prior technologies and render simple
comparisons between broadband and its predecessors suspect.
A. Liberty, Equality, and Electronic Speech
Today, the most important First Amendment issues facing American
society concern the ways that disparities in economic resources affect
access to the marketplace of ideas .... It may be the case, as many
civil libertarians claim, that the average American has never been freer
to speak. It is probably also the case that the average American has
never had less opportunity to be heard.9'
[M]onpolistic practices, economies of scale, and an unequal distribution
of resources have made it difficult for new ventures to enter the busi-
ness of mass communications. Restriction of entry to the economically
advantaged quells voices today that might have been heard in the time
of the town meeting and. the pamphleteer.92
Recently, government and academic commentators have argued that the
government's role in assuring public access to the mass media should be
89. See JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 277-95 (1991).
90. See, e.g., Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
990, 991 (1989); Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38
CATH. U. L. REv. 401, 402-03 (1989).
91. MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 13, 14 (1991).
92. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 38.
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diminished or curtailed altogether. A number of government officials, most
notably the current Chairman of the FCC, have repeatedly argued for a return
to marketplace regulation.93 In some cases commentators have criticized poten-
tial Congressional legislation lacking a marketplace solution as being unconsti-
tutional. 94
Several recent cases have questioned or rejected the viability of scarcity as
a justification for government regulation of mass media.95 These media cases,
when read in conjunction with others concerning campaign finance reform,96
suggest that significant precedent exists to argue that the First Amendment
emphasizes private liberty to the exclusion of public access and equality.
Indeed, some scholars argue that First Amendment values are best protected
in the absence of government regulation. For them, any government intervention
in the marketplace invariably stifles speech.97 Given a choice between private
or government censorship, these scholars contend that government censorship
is worse because "[i]f one private person suppresses a fact, there are many
others who may publish it. Not so if the government forbids !-98 Nevertheless,
one "cannot evade the need for positive governmental action in some cases to
secure meaningful opportunities for speech."99
The difficulty with the private liberty model of the First Amendment is what
it ignores or dismisses. Large corporations controlling communication through
93. For instance, FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes and Commissioners Sherrie Marshall and Andrew Barrett
have favored marketplace solutions to a number of current regulatory issues. See Harry A. Jessel, FCC
Considers Restoring Must-Carry Rules, BROADCASTING, July 22, 1991, at 32 [hereinafter Jessel, Restoring);
Harry A. Jessel, Third Time May Be the Charm for Must Carry at FCC, BROADCASTING, May 20, 1991,
at 31 [hereinafter Jessel, Charm]. See also Andrew C. Barrett, Public Policy and the Advanced Intelligent
Network, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 413, 427 (1990).
94. Consistent with judicial precedent, Chairman Sikes has emphasized that the "must carry" solutions
proposed by Congress and the FCC may be unconstitutional. See Jessell, Restoring, supra note 93; Jessell,
Charm, supra note 93.
95. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434 (945); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985),
aft'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). Cf Michael Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Television
Operator: An Unprotected Sheild Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMMENT 1, 22 (1981).
96. See generally GRABER, supra note 91, at 185-215 (discussing the effects of property ownership
on expressive speech in the context of political campaigns and mass media.) Graber suggests that recent
Supreme Court precedents may support a conclusion that property owners can circumvent state-mandated
public access rights by claiming that the state regulations burden their right of expression. GRABER, supra
note 91, at 195 (citing and analyzing Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n. of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1 (1986)).
97. See EMORD, supra note 89, at 124.
98. Id. at 125 (quoting Louis Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster. Reflections on
Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REv. 768, 786 (1972)). Emord's and Jaffe's assertion is misapplied to
the majority of mass media. First, these organizations are usually composed of individuals collectively
engaged in the pursuit of economic enterprises. They are neither economically nor socially the equivalent
of "one private person." Moreover, the speech power they may assert by virtue of their economic power
is far greater than that of a private person.
99. Lawrence Tribe, Toward A Metatheory of the Free Speech, in CONSTrrTrrIONAL GOvERNMENT IN
AMERICA 1, 5 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1980).
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liberal FCC multiple and cross-ownership rules have the power to suppress
speech far in excess of that possessed by a private single person. Further, large
corporations have suppressed speech when their interests have benefited by
suppression. I°° This corporate power is more akin to that wielded by the
government than that wielded by the private individual.'
Further, the private liberty theory of the First Amendment rests in large part
on assumptions about liberty which parallel the flawed theory of free market
capitalism. The marketplace theory falsely assumes that bargainers are basically
equal in power, that true competition exists, and that all bargainers possess
adequate, if not perfect knowledge. 2 The marketplace of ideas also suffers
from real world ailments which undermine its effectiveness. "[S]ophisticated
and expensive communications technology, monopoly control of the media,
access limitations suffered by disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques
of behavior manipulation [advertising], irrational responses to propaganda, and
the arguable nonexistence of objective truth, all conflict with marketplace
ideals."0 3
The FCC's multiple and cross ownership rules concentrate private speech
power in the hands of media owners. These owners decide which non-owners
may have access and hence, who shall have effective speech rights. Under
current circumstances, the individual citizen may have the right to speak, but
lack the ability to be heard because of negligible access to a forum. Without
access to a forum, the liberty to speak is an ephemeral one.
One observer believes that "the healthy vision the framers of our Constitu-
tion had of roughly equal yeomen has ... been eroded in recent years by the
conglomerate ownership of newspapers, radio and TV stations, and book
publishers, as well as by the corporate veil that shrouds these companies from
serious scrutiny." 1" Such a result violates the meaning of the First Amend-
ment and the meaning of democracy. 105
The abuse of private liberty through the exercise of concentrated media
ownership may result in censorship and may frustrate the self-expression and
the dissemination of truth essential to a democracy."' Nevertheless, an insis-
tence that all citizens must have equality of access to the media may give the
government too large a role in controlling speech. 7 The real challenge to
100. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 36, at 90-101, 216-20.
101. See Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 781, 787 (1987).
102. See John Shockley, Al the Free Speech that Money Can Buy?, in JUDGING THE CONSTrruTION
378, 389 (Michael McCann & Gerald Houseman eds., 1989).
103. Ingber, supra note 92, at 5.
104. Norman Dorsen, The Need for a New Enlightenment: Lessons in Liberty from the Eighteenth
Century, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 479, 492 (1988).
105. Tribe, supra note 99.
106. See GRABER, supra note 91, at 87-89.
107. EMERSON, supra note 41.
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Congress, the court, and civil libertarians lies in the development of a regula-
tory scheme somewhere between absolute liberty and absolute equality. How
may we assure both equal access and individual liberty to speak while minimiz-
ing the dangers of private speech and government regulation?
B. Mass Communications, Broadband, and the Clash of Competing First
Amendment Rights
At the center of communications policy in the United States lies an
unresolved, and perhaps irresolvable, tension between two competing
aspects of our free press tradition. On the one hand . . . a free...
independent and autonomous press .... On the other hand, ... an
accessible [press].108
Congress, the FCC, and the courts have struck the balance between the
fundamental speech rights of media owners and the public differently depending
upon the particular technology employed."°9 In doing so, they have relied at
times on the private liberty interpretation of the First Amendment and at times
on the public equality interpretation of the First Amendment. The balance struck
in such instances has been subject to significant scholarly review and criti-
cism."10
There are inherent problems in adapting any of the regulatory schemes
applied to preceding technologies to interactive broadband technology. First,
except in the case of telephone regulations, the communications regulations
govern one-way point to multi-point communication or transmission technolo-
gies, not two-way interactive technology. These regulatory schemes contemplate
one speaker, the media owner, whose speech rights may or may not be circum-
scribed by the government under limited circumstances. This speaker communi-
cates with or transmits to a mass audience composed of individuals who,
although not captive, are usually passive. The audience will hear only that
which the speaker wishes to tell them.
By contrast, broadband technology contemplates the existence of at least
two speakers in an interactive exchange of information. Neither party is passive,
as both possess the ability to communicate with one another on any of a variety
of subjects. Furthermore, unlike telephony, interactive broadband technology
will allow an individual speaker to communicate with large groups of people.
Regardless of whether the exchange of information occurs between two or more
persons, two or more machines, a person and a machine, or several persons and
108. ABRAMSON, supra note 34, at 293-94.
109. See EMERSON, supra note 41; POOL, supra note 45.
110. See ABRAMSON, supra note 34, at 239-60; POOL, supra note 45, at 8-15.
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machines, the critical feature of broadband usage is that both parties may create,
package, process, and transmit information. Furthermore, broadband communi-
cation need not be limited to voice or data, but also may include video and
combinations of voice, data, and video. This capacity for interactive com-
munication through multiple forms of information sets broadband apart from
its predecessors.
Although broadband technology combines many of the capacities of its
predecessors, broadband technology should not be governed by the conflicting
speech regulations applied to these preexisting technologies. Regulatory solu-
tions which work for a technology and information specific network distribution
system would create chaos if applied to a single broadband communications
distribution system.
1. Print, Personal Liberty, and Broadband
Government regulation of print media is limited. The owner's speech right
is virtually absolute to protect against government intrusion. Consequently, the
public enjoys no right of access to the media or to diverse points of view
except at the print editor's election. A right of assembly is technically infeasible
since the print media does not allow a group of individuals to address one
another in real time. The pages of a print medium may serve as a forum for
individuals to memorialize the substance of views previously expressed, but
even this form of access occurs only at the discretion of the publisher. Competi-
tion for advertising revenue and liability under the defamation laws provide two
of the few limitations on the editorial control exercised by print owners. These
features make print regulation the embodiment of the private liberty model of
First Amendment interpretation.
Application of the print model to broadband networks, while perhaps
pleasing to a number of constitutional purists, would deny the public a right
of access to the broadband network. The discretion to allow access for private
as well as public speech would reside entirely with the owner/carrier. Such a
development would wreak havoc upon the relatively well-ordered telecommu-
nications common carrier market and its users. Users would find not only their
private and public speech, but also their social and business activities circum-
scribed by broadband network providers."' The same broadband network
provider would both own the network and decide who has access to the net-
work and its users. Endowed with this power, a broadband network provider
could demand a financial interest in any business seeking to reach subscribers
on its network.
111. See Fisher, supra note 30, at 981-82.
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Regulating broadband based on the print model would exacerbate the
problems of private censorship and self-serving editorializing sometimes
experienced in the print mass media because the broadband network provider
would control a greater number of communication channels." 2 The provider
would control the public's access to information and other speakers' access to
the public. In effect, the broadband network provider would control the scope
of individuals' speech, access, assembly, and diversity rights. Subscribers would
hear, see, and receive only that information which the provider chose to allow.
If the private liberty model is applied to broadband, the promise of broadband
technology will be eviscerated, if not destroyed.
2. Personal Liberty Circumscribed by Government Mandated Access
a. Broadcasting and the Public Interest
Government regulations limit the editorial control of broadcast media
owners. Federal political broadcast rules require broadcast licensees to make
air time available to political candidates running for federal office. The licensee
must also make air time available for political candidates if the licensee has
provided air time to the candidates' opponents." 3 Consequently, the public,
through their public officials, enjoy a limited right of access.
During the 1980s, the FCC defined narrowly the limited right of public
access to broadcast facilities and to the presentation of diverse points of
view." 4 Aside from the political broadcast rules and the required issues lists,
the public must depend on the broadcaster's exercise of editorial discretion and
the pressure exerted by competing broadcasters and cable operators to assure
some diversity of viewpoint. Under these circumstances, the broadcaster is free
to program exclusively to those elements of the audience that have sufficient
disposable income to be of interest to advertisers.' 5 The programming pre-
sented to attract desirable audiences will reflect only limited socio-economic
viewpoints and interests." 6
A right of assembly is technically feasible in the broadcast media, but
depends upon broadcaster discretion. For instance, there are a number of public
112. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 36, at 94-101.
113. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 312(a)(7) (1991); 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1930,73.1940,76.205,76.209(d) (1990).
114. In 1985, the FCC determined that the fairness doctrine did not serve the public interest and raised
doubts about the doctrine's constitutionality. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). The FCC also removed a number of requirements aimed at
assuring that broadcasters addressed issues of importance to the area of license.
115. See ABRAMSON, supra note 34, at 288.
116. "[D]eregulationists ... point to the large menu of programs form which consumers may choose.
But... [i]f more of the same sort of programming is coming from the same few sources, the aura of choice
and diversity is an illusion." ABRAMSON, supra note 34, at 264.
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affairs programming formats relying on televised interaction between individu-
als engaged in discussions at the studio"7 or between individuals at the studio
and at remote locations.) 8 Nevertheless, as a legal and practical matter the
broadcaster maintains control over the selection of speakers and the information
aired.
Although the broadcast model allows a minimal level of public access, its
application to broadband network providers would be problematic. The access
provided by the broadcast model is available only to politicians running for
federal office and non-federal candidates whose opponents have received air
time."9 Allowing only limited access to a particular class of speakers denies
the public direct rights of access, speech, assembly, and diversity.12"
b. Multi-Channel Video Subscription Technologies and Public
Access
Operators of other multi-channel services, such as cable television and many
of the new video subscription technologies,' also have significant editorial
control over their channels of communications. Many cable television franchi-
sees are required to provide access to the public via leased access channels and
through public, educational, and government (PEG) access channels. 22' By
contrast, wireless video subscription services must elect common carrier status
before they have any corresponding obligation to provide access to the pub-
lic. 12 3
While there is no legally mandated public right of assembly, wired and
wireless cable television system owners may, at their discretion, allow forum
programming similar to the type provided by broadcasters. Individuals or groups
securing access to cable television via leased and PEG channels may also elect
to transmit forum programming. However, the diversity of information received
by the public is dependent upon the cable operator's editorial discretion, as
117. Examples are Agronsky and Company on WUSA Channel 9 in Washington, D.C., and the Capitol
Gang produced by Fox.
118. Live newscasts and programs such as ABC's Nightline are examples of this format. The Larry
King show, produced by Turner Broadcasting, allows viewers to call-in and speak with the host and guests.
119. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (1991).
120. Some may argue that such a government mandated, class oriented restriction on speech is
inconsistent with government neutrality. See William E. Lee, Cable Leased Access and the Conflict Among
First Amendment Rights and First Amendnent Values, 35 EMORY L.J. 563, 594 (1986).
121. Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service (MMDS), Operational Fixed Service (OFS), and
Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS) are microwave subscription technologies possessing the same
transmission capacity as broadcast stations. These microwave based subscription services are licensed by
the federal government. See In re Amendment of Parts 21, 43, 74, 78, 94 of the Commission's Rules
Governing Use of the Frequencies in the 2.1 and 2.5 GHz Bands, 5 F.C.C.2d 6410 (1990); In re Subscription
Video Services, No. 85-538, 1986 F.C.C. Lexis 4173 (1986).
122. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59 (1988).
123. See BRENNER, supra note 13, at §§ 16.02(5), 16.04(2)(a).
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influenced by the market demand for subscription services, by the competition
for subscribers and advertisers, and by the wired cable television access regula-
tions.
In the case of cable television, federal and local government regulations
limit the media owner's ability to control public access to the transmission
paths. The rationale for balancing the personal liberty and public equality
models through regulation of the cable industry is based on cable television's
status as a monopoly using public rights of way. By contrast, owners of
subscription mass media relying on new applications of spectrum based technol-
ogies retain the right to choose the extent of public access based on the type
of media business the owners wish to conduct. Thus, owners of subscription
mass media may elect to be in the transmission business and eschew editorial
control over information content. Alternatively, an owner may choose common,
or to a lesser extent private, carriage and surrender some portion of his or her
personal liberty to government regulation of access."2 Finally, owners of
subscription mass media may elect to enter the information business and
maintain control over both transmission facilities and information content. In
this case, personal liberty is retained due to judicially sanctioned FCC reluc-
tance to impose broadcast related access requirements on the owner speak-
ers.
125
Like extensions of the print and broadcast models, application of the cable
model to broadband network providers also has significant problems. The cable
model requires some measure of public access. Cable television systems of a
certain size must provide commercial leased access channels. 26 However, the
cable operator may effectively control the content on the leased access channels
via price, tier placement, or the withholding of marketing, billing, or other
services. 127 The net effect of a cable operator's control of these variables may
124. For example, MMDS operators may elect noncommon carrier or common carrier status. If they
elect common carrier status, they are regulated as non-dominant common carriers, which affords the MMDS
operator substantial control in defining the class of eligible subscribers and the manner in which he or she
offers services. See Multipoint Distribution Service, No. 86-179,63 R.R.2d 398 (1987). If MMDS operators
choose non-common carrier status, they may exercise control over both the transmission and programming
aspects of their business without fear of the imposition of broadcast regulation. National Ass'n for Better
Broadcasting v. FCC, 849 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cit. 1988). See generally BRENNER, supra note 13, at §§ 16.02(5),
16.04(2).
125. See Better Broadcasting, 849 F.2d 665.
126. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 531 (authorizing local franchising
authorities to establish franchise requirements for the designation or use of public, educational and
governmental channels), 532 (establishing the criteria under which cable systems with more than thirty-five
channels must offer commercial leased access channels) (1991).
127. See Lampert, supra note 6, at 8, 12-15. Lampert argues that the leased access provisions of the
Act afford little viable protection to outside programmers seeking commercial access to cable television
systems. Given the cable operators' ability to increase profits by restricting access, the burden of proof
is imposed on the complaining party. Courts are prohibited from examining the agreements between the
cable operators and their affiliated programmers.
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be to foreclose effective access to some programmers. This ability to foreclose
access supplements the cable operator's power to prevent the transmission of
programming services in which it has no financial interest.'28
Franchising authorities also may require cable systems to provide PEG
access channels.' 29 The individual members of the public, therefore, may
secure limited access to certain cable systems on a non-discriminatory, first
come, first served basis. Public rights to speech and assembly also flow from
this limited access. While this right of access is greater than that afforded under
the print or broadcast models, an individual's ability to speak may be limited
by the imbalance between the number of channels available and the number
of people seeking access to them.
The number of channels the cable television owner operates and the leased
and mandatory access channels programmed by other parties arguably provide
a certain degree of diversity. However, the indirect controls a cable operator
can exercise over leased access channels may seriously undermine the diversity
which might otherwise be realized. Further, an expanded menu of programs
may not constitute meaningful diversity if all the programs are targeted to the
same class of potential users.
Unlike broadcasting and cable television, wireless video subscription service
owners have no corresponding duties to provide public access. Absent an
owner's election to assume common or private carrier status, the public has no
access right to the facilities. Thus, although the wireless video subscription
systems use the public airways and the electromagnetic spectrum in the same
manner as broadcast station licensees, system owners retain complete control
over access to this media. 3°
3. Telephony: Equality and Non-Discriminatory Access
Under principles of telecommunications common carriage, the owner of the
transmission facilities exercises no editorial control over the content of commu-
nications.' 3' Thus, in this communications arena, ownership is completely
separated from control over the content communicated. Conversations over the
public switched telecommunications network are labelled private rather than
public because they most often occur between two parties. Some scholars
128. See Henry Gilgoff, Report Card on Cablevision: Mixed Signals: Programs Praised, Fees
Criticized, NEWSDAY, Sept. 10, 1990, at 2; Chuck Stogel, Amid Cable TV Tangle, Is Viewer Being Served,
SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 27, 1990, at 45; States News Service, Congressional Help for Cable Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, § 12, at 1.
129. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1991).
130. See BRENNER, supra note 13.
131. See 47 U.S.C. § 3(h) (1991). See also DONALD E. LrVELY, MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW
289 (1991).
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maintain that such conversations are protected by privacy rights rather than
First Amendment law. 32
However, the categorization of telephone communications as private is
changing. For example, telemarketing and 800 and 900 number information
services all seek to reach large audiences. To the extent the private versus
public distinction is dependent upon the number of individuals a party seeks
to address, the enhanced service provider, by communicating to a mass audi-
ence, arguably has a First Amendment right to communicate. At least one First
Amendment scholar supports this proposition and maintains that, if the tele-
phone becomes a significant source for the communication of public infor-
mation, the First Amendment would apply to telephone communication. 33
In exchange for a fee, the public enjoys non-discriminatory access to the
transmission paths on the public switched network. Access is regulated by tariff,
a contract between the carrier and the subscriber, which establishes the subscri-
ber's eligibility, class, and charge for telecommunications services. Business
and residential subscribers may assemble with others through use of available
conference call and teleconferencing features. Data users sharing a common
data base or switch also may interact with one another simultaneously.
Interactive telephony comes closest to approximating the scope and flex-
ibility of the information transmission and use which may be achieved through
broadband technology. Subscriber access to diverse points of view is con-
strained only by the interests of other subscribers resident on the system, the
technical limitations of the network, and the legal and technical limitations on
access to services such as dial-a-pom. 34 However, while telephony provides
the public with non-discriminatory access within specific user groups, it does
so at the expense of the medium owner who has no corresponding speech
rights.
C. Application of Other Regulatory Theories to Broadband
Communications
At least three other broad regulatory theories may be suggested to manage
the allocation and protection of speech rights of broadband users and providers.
These schemes previously have been employed in or proposed for broadband's
antecedent technologies. They are deregulation, functional regulation, and public
forum regulation.
132. See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note 34, at 474-75.
133. See id. at 475. The categorization of this type of speech as public may have to be squared with
FCC policies and court cases categorizing such speech as private. See In re Subscription Video Services,
No. 85-538, 1986 F.C.C. Lexis 4173 (1986).
134. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (upholding a prohibition against obscene
interstate telephone communications).
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Deregulation is essentially a formulation of the print model of regulation
resting on an analogous economic justification. It suffers from the infirmities
of the marketplace and threatens to produce unchecked, economically sanc-
tioned private censorship. Functionalism is essentially a multi-faceted articula-
tion of the current status quo of mass media regulation. There are three models
of functional regulation: channel functionalism, media functionalism, and
operational functionalism. Regulation by channel or media function and content
describes the current approach in which regulations vary depending on the
technology employed and the information distributed by a communications
network. Channel function regulation cannot be applied to broadband because
broadband networks will integrate the network and, information functions of
existing communications media.
Media specific regulation fails for the same reasons that the current regula-
tion of print, broadcasting, cable, and common carriage fail. Current models
diminish or eliminate the speech rights of either the public or the owner.
Moreover, media functionalism fails to address the detrimental impact on public
access of multiple and cross-ownership of information distribution media or
networks. Finally, operational functionalism is based on a cogent articulation
of the rationale for maintaining the separation between transmission and content
currently found in common carrier regulation. Nevertheless, this model of
regulation fails because it would undermine the owner/speaker's speech rights
and involve the government in judgments regarding the value of various types
of speech.
1. Deregulation
Proponents of deregulation maintain that increased competition within the
marketplace provides increased diversity at lower cost to the consumer. As a
consequence, government regulation to achieve greater diversity and access
becomes unnecessary and actually may thwart the realization of First Amend-
ment rights and goals. Supporters of the deregulation model argue that telco
entry into the video marketplace, along with the entry of DBS and wireless
cable, will reduce video service prices, increase alternative programmer access
to the video marketplace, and increase the diversity of program choices avail-
able to consumers.135
If, however, public rights of speech, access, assembly, and diversity are the
cost for an increase in limited classes of programming diversity, the price may
135. See Harry Jessel, Sikes: Cable Competition, Not Regulation, BROADCASTING, Mar. 25, 1991, at
80 (mentioning Sikes' preference that Congress consider legislation that would promote competition rather
than further regulation of cable system prices).
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be too high. The public's enhanced speech opportunities should not be sacri-
ficed or treated as mere byproducts of the speaker/owner's editorial largesse.
Reliance on the economic marketplace assures that diversity of program-
ming will be no broader than the number of financially attractive audiences or
groups of subscribers. Competition will not assure service to those who lack
sufficient wealth or popularity to justify the owner/editor's.carriage of their
ideas. While such a result would be consistent with much of the history of mass
media development in the United States,' 36 it is inconsistent with the protec-
tion and enhancement of society's First Amendment freedoms.
2. Functionalism '-
Scholars have suggested several function related methods which one might
use to regulate mass media technology. One method would allow government
regulation based on the type of information provided over a channel of commu-
nication. A second method would allow government regulation based on the
medium of transmission employed. Yet another method seeks to peg regulation
to the transmission function, leaving information content unregulated. Each
method seeks to retain elements of the private liberty theory and the public
access theory of speech in the process of balancing the speech rights of media
owners and the public.
a. Channel Functionalism
Channel functionalism would allow the government to regulate the use of
channels or transmission paths based on the type of information transmitted on
that channel. Speech rights, therefore, would differ depending on whether a
channel transmitted print, video, voice, or data.'37 Some maintain that channel
functionalism resolves the intractable problems caused by the ". . . fruitless
search for one legal category applicable to all of [a communications medium's]
divergent functions."' 13
Channel functionalism acknowledges the transmission medium owner's
capacity either to operate as an electronic speaker or to afford access to other
speakers. The model assumes, however, that the decision between being a
speaker and being a provider of access to other speakers can be made on a
channel by channel or shared channel basis. Thus, in the case of direct broad-
cast satellites (DBS), the FCC premised early regulation on the basis of the
136. Carter, supra note 35, at 581.
137. See Donald Le Duc, "Unbundling" the Channels: A Functional Approach to Cable TV Legal
Analysis, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 4-5. See also Meyerson, supra note 95, at 26.
138. Le Duc, supra note 137, at 12.
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DBS operator's election to be a broadcaster or a common carrier.'39 Similarly,
the FCC premised its early regulation of Multichannel Multipoint Distribution
Service (MMDS) on the MMDS operator's election to be a subscription service
videocaster or a common carder.
Cable television is arguably regulated on a functional basis as well. The
operator, by election or by requirement of law, determines the channels over
which he or she will speak and those over which broadcast, commercial, or
public programmers will speak. As a legal matter, however, cable operators are
not considered broadcasters or common carriers.
Some scholars have argued for the express regulation of cable operators on
a functional basis."4 They suggest that when cable retransmits broadcast
signals it should be regulated as a broadcaster. When originating programming,
the cablecaster should be regulated under the print model. Finally, provision
of access via the lease and public access channel requirements should essen-
tially transform the cable operator into a common carrier.'4' Using slightly
different analyses, other scholars also suggest that passive relay transmission
of broadcast signals should be treated like common carriage and receive no
First Amendment protection. 42
The functional approach to hybrid technology regulation has significant
limitations which make it an inappropriate choice for broadband communication
networks. It presumes that the facility owner has already allocated channels by
function. This may be true in the case of cable, DBS, and MMDS, but what
happens when allocation of function is the issue? For instance, if Congress
decides to allow telephone company entry into the electronic print and video
markets, the telephone companies may be regulated as speaker/owners under
the print model. As such, a telephone company could deny access rights to the
business and consumer/user public. Moreover, when a single channel can
simultaneously carry multiple types of information reduced to indistinguishable
digitized bit streams, regulators will be unable to ascertain what information
is traversing which channels at what times. Thus broadband technology would
render channel regulation obsolete.
139. NAB v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
140. See generally Le Duc, supra note 137; Meyerson, supra note 95, at 24-26.
141. Henry Geller & Donna Lampert, Cable Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 32 CATH.
U. L. REv 603 (1983). The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, however, expressly distinguishes
cable carriage from common carriage. See 47 U.S.C. § 611 (1991).
142. Le Duc, supra note 137, at 13. This proposal does not acknowledge that to the extent a cablecaster
may choose which broadcast stations to carry, he or she is exercising editorial choice. The decision of whom
to carry is no more passive than a decision to carry certain programmers. To the extent that the cable
operator is required by law to carry certain broadcast signals, passive carriage constitutes a forced act of
editorial forbearance, not editorial indifference.
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b. Media Functionalism
The second method proposed is regulation by media type."' The medium
functionalism model seeks to assure both private liberty and public access by
relegating realization of these rights to separate although functionally inter-
changeable media. One scholar has proposed retaining the print medium as the
bastion of unregulated speech while retaining broadcasting as the vehicle for
assuring public access.'" For Bollinger, the current bifurcated regulation of
print and broadcasting is constitutionally correct because it permits access
regulation in part of the media while not making access to the press univer-
sal. 45 Similarly, Ingber suggest that preservation of the free .press in an age
of access regulation may be achieved by deregulating radio while maintaining
access regulation for television.'The solution of partial regulation which leaves a portion of the electronic
media unregulated and another subject to access requirements is an attractive
accommodation to current realities. 47 However, even efforts to minimize the
abuses of press and government through regulatory bifurcation are subject, in
moderate degree, to the same deficiencies as the constitutional models and
regulatory schemes they seek to subsume. Three interrelated developments make
this seemingly pragmatic and practical solution problematic.
First, the technologies on which various forms of media are based increas-
ingly carry other forms of information. Spectrum-based broadcast channels can
carry print information as well as video information. 4" Many spectrum tech-
nologies can also carry interactive voice traffic. Indeed, some already do.
143. See Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976); See also Stanley Ingber, The First Amendment
in Modem Garb: Retaining System Legitimacy-A Review of Lucas Powe's American Broadcasting and
the First Amendment, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 187 (1987).
144. See Bollinger, supra note 143.
145. See id.
146. Ingber, supra note 143, at 235. The FCC was ultimately successful in removing a significant
portion of radio regulation.
147. Such a solution recognizes the distinction between government regulation of print and broadcast
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) and Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The proposed solution would do nothing to solve the
apparently intractable difficulty the courts have had in determining the constitutional status of cable public,
leased and mandatory access regulations. See Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1985), aft'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (substituting cable operator's right to program entire cable
system with sharing access to mandatory and leased access channels on one's system diminishes the cable
operator's freedom of expression); Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (1985); Berkshire Cablevision
of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985)
(holding that mandatory access rules are constitutional).
148. "in today's rapidly developing communications industry, the distinction between these converging
media [of print and broadcasting] is unstatable and inadequate." Mark S. Nadel, A Unified Theory of the
First Amendment: Divorcing the Medium from the Message, FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 166 (1982).
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Should the medium over which the information travels determine First Amend-
ment rights in such circumstances?
Second, multiple technologies are being combined to deliver the same or
multiple types of information. A publishing company may use spectrum, wire
and traditional print technologies to deliver a national daily newspaper. Cable
companies rely on spectrum and wire technologies for delivery of video prod-
uct. Even the term "media," takes on a multi-dimensional meaning which
technically precludes a media-function-oriented regulatory approach.
Third, cross-ownership of all forms of mass media whether print, broadcast
or cable television is extensive.4 9 Print companies own broadcast stations;
television companies own radio stations; and cable companies may own broad-
cast and print companies. As a result, government may indirectly influence
unregulated media through licensing decisions made regarding regulated media
subsidiaries5 ° and editorial decisions of unregulated media owners may affect
public access and the flow of information over their regulated media subsidiar-
ies.' 5' This has historically proved to be the case. 1 2
Bollinger's answer is that while the government may chill the speech of
regulated media and their subsidiaries, unregulated and unaffiliated media are
still able to speak in an unregulated environment. 53 To the extent that media
cross-ownership, coupled with increased concentration of ownership, becomes
the dominant form of media structure, 5 4 however, the check against govern-
ment abuse diminishes because an ever increasing number of speakers may be
indirectly influenced by government actions regarding their regulated subsidiar-
ies. Meanwhile, the threat of private abuse would grow because of the increas-
ing concentration of economic and editorial power.
As relatively interchangeable competitive media are increasingly cross-
owned, absolute concentration of media ownership increases. This process
increases the opportunity for private censorship. And, as private censorship
increases, pressures for government protection from private censorship increase
as well. Given cross-ownership and media concentration, media functionalism
fails to provide a viable resolution to the threats of government and private
censorship.
149. See generally BArDIKLAN, supra note 36, at 239-51.
150. See id. at 99.
151. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied 403
U.S. 923 (1971).
152. See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra note 36, at 208-22.
153. Bollinger, supra note 143, at 33.
154. See BAGODIKIAN, supra note 36, at 3-26.
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c. Operational Functionalism
The third model, operational functionalism, would separate the transmission
medium from the message transmitted. 55 The transmission medium would
be regulated but the message arguably would not be regulated. 56 Speech is
defined as the act of creating or editing a message entitled to copyright protec-
tion. 157 The act of creation would encompass the right to include or exclude
information. Such activities would enjoy absolute First Amendment protection
from government regulation.
By contrast, the owner of the medium of transmission would not be entitled
to direct First Amendment protection The owner's ability to include or exclude
messages would be defined as an economic right attached to the ownership of
the transmission medium.15 As such, the owner's discretion to control access
would be subject to government regulation. Media owners would be subject to
government regulation if they possessed enough economic or technological
monopoly power to enable them to censor messages.'59 However, the owner
would be allowed to assert speech rights of inclusion on behalf of creators
using his or her medium.
Operational functionalism is based in large measure on the public forum
doctrine. 60 As such, user speech rights are dependant on the owners' election
to make access available to the public. The private owner need not elect to
make his or her medium available to the public. Only economic necessity will
compel an owner to open up the privately owed medium. To the extent privat-
ization of more and larger portions of the public switched network continues
at its current pace, a substantial number of owners will enter into private
switching and transport arrangements which may exclude significant portions
of the public.' 6' And, those members of the public who do have access to a
medium may find their rights circumscribed by contract, practice or law.162
155. See Nadel, supra note 148.
156. Id. at 177-94.
157. Id. at 181-82.
158. Id. at 177-80.
159. Id. at 192.
160. See infra, notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
161. Private networks such as metropolitan area networks (MANs), local area networks (LANs), and
value added networks (VANs) are often owned and operated by private entities which act essentially as
private carriers or forebome common carriers offering switching and transport services for specific
customers. See EoAN, supra note 1, at 72; Terrence P. McGarty, paper presented to the Information
Infrastructure for the 1990's Workshop at John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University. It is estimated that
there are as many as 700,000 private networks in the United States. Guilder, supra note 2. See also Michael
Schuyler, Systems Librarian and Automation Review: Rights of Computer On-Line Service Users, SMALL
COMPUTERS IN LIBRARIES, Dec. 1990, at 41. Schuyler argues that the American right to assemble is
endangered by the increasing privatization of public fora.
162. The FCC forebears from substantial regulation of private carriers on the theory that they lack
sufficient market power to require regulation.
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Aside from the practical considerations mentioned above, reliance on the
public forum doctrine to support operational functionalism is problematic, The
caselaw on which it is based can be cited for and against the proposition that
ownership of the medium of transmission can be separated from the message
transmitted, and the proposition that an owner's exercise of editorial control
does not rise to the status of protected speech. 63
The ambiguity in the caselaw is understandable. It is theoretically difficult
to distinguish an owner's editorial control over his or her channel from an
author's ability to edit what will appear in his or her creation. The exercise and
function are basically the same. In both instances the actor determines, by
exercise of choice, what will be said and how it will be stated. The only
difference is one of degree. In one instance, the constructed message is created
and owned by the creator-author. In the other, the message is constructed by
the owner from creations produced by others. Is one form -of construction or
creation to be afforded less speech protection than the other? Is rap music or
an art collage less of an art form because it is composed from other music or
art? And, is the government the appropriate arbiter of whether and where that
line is to be drawn? Alexander Meiklejohn and other First Amendment schol-
ars would answer these questions in the negative.S'4
Finally, to draw arguably identifiable but administratively difficult, and
constitutionally suspect lines of demarcation regarding speech jeopardizes much
of the promise of computer-augmented broadband communication. Many
potential electronic publishers would be engaged in activity similar to those for
which the media owner would be accorded less First Amendment protection.
These publishers would be combining images, data, text and sound into new
creations as well as creating entirely original transmissions.
Nevertheless, a media owner's aggregation of economic power or his or her
acquisition of government sanctioned monopoly power sufficient to censor the
messages of others, is a matter of grave concern. Absent a technological
solution enhanced by a gradual but permanent change in public habits of
communication, some form of government mandated access may be the only
viable solution.
3. Public and Private Fora
Certain commentators have suggested that the public forum doctrine might
provide an excellent tool for allocating speech rights in the context of hybrid
163. The Court has failed to define the term "editorial" to exclude pure business decisions. See Nadel,
supra note 148, at 182-83.
164. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, SUP. CT. REv. 245, 262 (1961).
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technology.165 They argue that the doctrine is useful where the hybrid technol-
ogy possesses similarities to existing technologies, as well as unique characteris-
tics of its own.'66 Because the doctrine is not premised on the particular char-
acteristics of a technology, it facilitates the analysis of speech rights in the
context of new technologies like broadband.
a. Traditional Public and Private Speech Fora
As a practical matter, speech fora exist in several guises and classifications.
Among them are traditional public fora such as public streets, sidewalks and
parks which have traditionally been associated with expressive activity,'67 as
well as public facilities or institutions created for the primary purpose of public
communication. There are also quasi-public fora, which are usually public
facilities, such as schools and libraries, created for other purposes but having
a close relationship to expression. The openness of these facilities to expressive
activity is often a function of whether the government has designated them as
public fora. 66 However, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of state regulations preventing owners of some private fora from restricting
public speech on their property.'69
Under current definitions of public and private fora, media of communica-
tion may be argued by analogy to be public fora, quasi-public fora or private
fora open to the public. 70 For instance, the public switched networks may
be argued to be public fora because traditionally they have been regulated to
be open to the public at large on a non-discriminatory basis. Broadcasting and
cable television may be argued to be quasi-public fora in that they are desig-
nated as open to the public under limited circumstances.' 7' By comparison,
print media could be categorized as private fora because absent the election of
the publisher/owner, print media are not open to the public.
Alternatively, if the use of scarce public resources is the criteria for identify-
ing a public forum, telephony, cable and broadcasting would all be classified
as public fora. For example, both telephone and cable television firms make
use of public streets and rights of way, and broadcasting makes use of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
165. Wirth & Cobb-Reilly, supra note 87, at 401-04; Meyerson, supra note 95, at 31-40.
166. Wirth & Cobb-Reilly, supra note 87, at 402.
167. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 688.
168. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (holding that the
regulation of written material at a state fair does not unnecessarily limit the right of citizens to reach the
minds of listeners).
169. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
170. Meyerson, supra note 95, at 36-37; Nadel, supra note 148, at 175-76.
171. Broadcasters must make some time available for federal candidates running for public office. Cable
casters of a certain size are required to provide mandatory public access and leased access.
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Under the media-oriented definition of speech fora referenced above, a
public forum may be argued to exist where an individual owner or entity has
monopoly control over a medium of communication or possesses sufficient
economic power to effectively censor messages of others seeking access to the
forum (telephone, cable and arguably broadcasting).'72 A quasi-public forum
exists where essentially private facilities are opened to the public for limited
purposes, as in the case of broadcasting and cable. A private forum exists where
a private individual or entity is not required to open its facilities to the public,
but nevertheless elects to do so, as in the case of certain subscription technolo-
gies. 73 Print media do not fit neatly into this formulation of the doctrine,
because despite their economic status as local monopolies, they are deemed
private fora, not subject to any access requirements.
The public/private forum doctrine has met with significant criticism in the
non-media context. First, the distinction between government and private
property is said to obscure the fact that the issue is access to property,'74 by
non-property owners. 75 This distinction also ignores the effects that the exer-
cise of property rights by a government or private owner have on the realization
of public speech rights. Increasingly, communication via electronic technology
is more effective than communication by traditional means. As a result, access
to communications technology is critical to the realization of effective
speech. 1
76
Second, to the extent that government or private owners may withdraw the
designation of a forum as "public," that portion of the public with insufficient
wealth or an unpopular message may be effectively precluded from speech. 77
This second criticism applies equally to electronic media.
b, Application of the Public/Private Forum Doctrine to Broadband
Communications
Before the public/private forum doctrine can be applied to broadband
communications, interactive broadband networks and on-line databases should
be designated as "public forums." Such a designation might follow from the
broadband provider's use of the public streets and rights of way, 7 1 or the
172. Nadel, supra note 148, at 176.
173. Id.
174. Balkin, Frontiers of Legal Thought II, The New First Amendment: Some Realism About Pluralism,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 397-400.
175. Id.
176. Carter, supra note 35; Balkin, supra note 174.
177. Balkin, supra note 174, at 397; Ingber, supra note 92, at 42.
178. See Tele-communications of Key West v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cit. 1985); Preferred
Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cit. 1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
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electromagnetic spectrum. 79 In either instance, the government could presum-
ably license one or more broadband providers to operate over or under certain
public streets and rights-of-way, or, on certain frequencies to the exclusion of
others seeking access to the same government provided resources.
Another critical component would be a determination that the privately
owned fiber optic cables and assorted digital equipment resident in or over the
streets "are an essential part of the public forum and subject to the same First
Amendment mandates and the same limits on government regulation."'"0 The
RBOCs and the cable television systems, the most likely providers of interactive
broadband services, already enjoy the use of public rights of way and
streets.' 8 1 Historically, the quid quo pro for use of these public resources has
been public use of the facilities of common carriers, and more recently, public
use of the facilities of cable operators for public communication and expres-
sion. 2
Public forum status could also be justified on the grounds that the switching
and transmission provider possesses an economic or natural monopoly. 8 3 This
rationale would require the legislature to provide the courts and the FCC with
guidelines for determining when market-based, technology-driven, or govern-
ment-sanctioned economic control is so great that it allows the owner to
effectively censor the speech of others seeking access to the forum.
Quasi-public forum status may apply to private providers of switched
transmission services and owners of private on-line data services. The rationale
for classifying these communication modes as quasi-public fora would be that
the owners, in order to conduct business, have elected to open their media of
communication to the public.'8'
The public/private forum doctrine could provide an appropriate foundation
for a skeletal regulatory framework to balance speaker-owner and public-user
speech rights. However, in order to do so effectively, it must address several
important issues. Congress should establish an easily accessible public forum
179. Emerson, supra note 40, at 823; Wirth & Cobb-Reilly, supra note 87, at 402; Meyerson, supra
note 95, at 24, 36-37.
180. Wirth & Cobb-Reilly, supra note 87, at 402.
181. See id. at 400-02; Meyerson, supra note 95, at 24-26.
182. See Lavey, infra note 214, at 184-85; Meyerson, supra note 95, at 41.
183. See In Re Policy and Rules Concerning the Furnishing of Customer Prenises Equipment, Enhanced
Services and Cellular Communications Services by the Bell Operating Companies, 95 F.C.C. 2d 1117,1123-
39 (1983), affd sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984). See also, Frank
Lloyd, Cable Television's Emerging Two- Way Services: A Dilemma For Federal and State Regulators, 36
VAND. L. REv. 1045 (1983).
184. It might be argued that the FCC has taken a contrary position with regard to the regulation of
video subscription services such as multi-channel multipoint distribution. See note 130 and accompanying
text. Under the FCC's reasoning, making services available to a mass audience does not constitute opening
one's facilities to the public as long as each individual customer enters into a separate contract with the
provider.
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as an alternative to private forum speech, develop incentives to assure the
continued cost effective existence of public forums, and identify workable
criteria for determining whether a forum should be deemed public or private.
The criteria should also address transitions between public and private forum
status. Finally, the public/private forum model must protect against private and
government censorship. Within the public forum, the owner's exercise of
property rights and the government's exercise of the licensing power must be
circumscribed in order to limit the risk of government and private censorship.
The goal of this type of regulatory scheme would be to create and preserve
meaningful opportunities for public access and public speech, while also
preserving the speech rights of media owners.'85
4. A New Model for Public and Private Fora
a. Developing a Viable and Accessible Public Forum
The creation of viable and enduring public fora will depend on several
factors. First, entrepreneurs must have incentives to create and maintain them.
This can be accomplished in part by extending the limited liability protections
currently enjoyed by common carriers to the providers of broadband public fora.
Limitations on liability would include the absence of responsibility or liability
for the speech of any user of the forum and a limitation of liability for service
failures to the charge made for the service provided. Liberal tax and financing
incentives would also encourage the development and maintenance of such
network fora.8 6
Second, the fora must be accessible to the general public and have signifi-
cant utility to the average user. In this regard the government incentives
mentioned above may have a constructive impact on the development of the
fora. In any event, the fora must be widespread and interconnected to insure
their accessibility to the general public. Aside from government incentives,
efforts must be made to encourage public use of the network and services by
creating a minimum service configuration that assures all prospective users
effective use of the network.'87
185. Emerson, supra note 40, at 823.
186. Alternative incentive structures have been proposed. Some argue that advanced network features
be provided on a demand and cost sensitive basis, with targeted subsidies where necessary. See NAT'L
TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE
OF INFORMATION, 307-14 (1991) (discussing universal service and Advanced Universal Service Access
"Advanced USA") [hereinafter NTIA Infrastructure Report]; Barrett, supra note 93, at 429-30.
187. See Dertouzos, Communications, Computers, and Networks, supra note 52, at 65-67; Dertouzos,
Building the Information Marketplace, supra note 52, at 31-34.
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b. Public and Private Fora Defined
Public and private fora may exist on at least two if not three levels. Some
fora will exist at the transmission channel and/or network level. Some will exist
at the equipment or receiver/display level. Finally, some will combine both the
transmission and communications equipment levels. Regardless of level, public
and private fora should be constructed to possess distinct criteria.
Public fora would be deemed to exist in two major categories, per se public
fora and voluntary public fora. Transmission providers possessing natural,
physical or economic monopoly power, or possessing essential facilities would
be regulated as per se public fora.I55 Monopoly status would be defined by
statute and agency regulation, subject to modification or expansion through the
adjudication process. Voluntary public fora would consist of entities possessing
no monopoly or essential facilities status, but electing to be public fora by
making their transmission or speech facilities available to the public for expres-
sive activity.
In either case, public fora would enjoy limited liability for service degrada-
tion or outages absent gross negligence or evidence establishing an attempt to
censor user speech. The public fora would also enjoy immunity from liability
for the content of any user speech carried, presented or displayed over public
fora facilities. Finally, the public fora would be eligible for tax incentives and
other financial incentives to encourage system and service upgrades.
Private fora would be composed of firms or services without monopoly
power or essential facilities. For the most part, these entities would be using
dedicated or leased facilities providing service to distinct, specialized users.
These entities would provide public notice of their intent to offer private forum
services. They would maintain full control over access to their channels and/or
networks and full editorial control over any speech conducted through their
facilities. Consequently, they would have full liability for any loss of service
(subject to their ability to negotiate a lesser liability with users) and full liability
for what is said over their facilities. To the extent they rely on interconnection
to public fora facilities to provide service, they would have to make available
188. NTIA has conceded the utility of this approach in its recent infrastructure report "[Riecognition
of First Amendment rights for [local telephone companies] would not be inconsistent with continuation of
their long-standing common carrier obligations in other respects .... [B]ecause it is well established that
a firm can be a common carrier for some purposes and not for others, there is no legal or policy reason
why a [local telephone company] could not be a common carrier with respect to its distribution facilities,
and also one of the First Amendment speakers using those facilities .... Indeed, imposing an obligation
on the [local telephone company] to provide 'equal access' to its underlying transmission facilities would
seem to be a legitimate, narrowly tailored way to ensure that a [local telephone company's] right to 'speak'
is consistent with its common carrier obligations and impedes neither competition nor the First Amendment
Rights of others." NTIA Infrastructure Report, supra note 186, at 234 n.840, 243 n.884 (citing FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 n.9 (1978); National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533
F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Ci. 1976); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
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some portion of their transmission capacity to other interconnected entities and
users on the public fora networks.
Congress, the FCC, or the courts would have to establish procedural and
evidentiary rules governing requests for a change from public to private or
private to public status. At a minimum, prudence would require allowing
transitions from private to public fora status where the provider voluntarily
seeks public fora status, or, where users and/or representatives of the public
successfully allege that a private entity has acquired monopoly power or
essential facilities. Similarly, a public forum or interested parties could petition
to change a public forum's status. In this case, the parties would have to
establish that the forum no longer possessed monopoly power or essential
facilities. In proceedings to determine public or private fora status, concerns
over the content of user speech would be insufficient basis for a transition
proceeding, and evidence tending to show such a motivation for a petition
would constitute sufficient grounds for the petition's dismissal.
c. Limitations on Government and Private Censorship
With regard to public fora, government regulation would have to protect
owners and users against government and private censorship. Public fora owners
would exchange access and content control over significant portions of their
facilities for limited liability for the foreseeable and consequential damages
arising out of their provision of service. They would also be absolved of
liability for the content of user speech. Any residual control of access or speech
by public forum owners would be in the form of content-neutral determinations
of the adequacy of available channel or network capacity and access or speech
queing. The government would not be authorized to penalize or hold the public
forum provider liable for any user-initiated and conducted speech, and a
potential public fora user could not be denied access to a public fora absent
constitutionally neutral criteria.
Public fora owners, through a fully owned subsidiary, would have the right
to communicate over their facilities or those of any other public fora. Users of
the public fora facilities would be allowed to petition at any time alleging
inappropriate censorship activities on the part of public fora owners. Congress
and the FCC would develop standards regarding the burden of proof and the
burden of going forward in such proceedings.
D. Summary
Reliance on any of the current regulatory schemes of print, broadcast or
common carriage has inherent flaws. Application of these models would ignore
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the continuous blurring of distinctions between technologies and the information
they deliver. Why should the legal status of the same information turn on the
manner in which it is delivered? Print may be distributed in hard copy or by
wire or microwave, and video may be transmitted over different portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum, by wire or by satellite. Nonetheless, the resulting
communication is the same.
Furthermore, use of these schemes places too great a burden on one or
another class of speakers. Either the public (print) or the owner-speaker (com-
mon carrier) finds its respective rights diminished or usurped. Finally, these
models do not reflect the full range of broadband technology's interactive
capacity and utility. Broadband's capacity to provide interactive communication
between individuals or groups of individuals, irrespective of the type of infor-
mation transmitted, distinguishes it from its predecessors. Extending the capa-
city for electronic speech to individual users may be the mechanism for equaliz-
ing the speech rights of media users and owners.'89
Reliance on the more general theoretical regulatory models also has its
limits. Deregulation, or marketplace regulation is essentially the economic
analogue to print regulation. It is an abdication of responsibility which leaves
the problem of private censorship unaddressed. At best, the public is left to
inherit whatever haphazard speech rights a significantly skewed marketplace
may develop. Given the growth in media cross-ownership and ownership
concentration, reliance on marketplace regulation will exacerbate the inequalities
of access generated by inequalities of wealth, and by the existence of economic,
technological and government-authorized monopolies.
Various function-related models also have limited value. Channel functional-
ism, in which regulation is based on the information carried, is simply non-
responsive to the new reality of fiber optic digital transmission of information.
Media functionalism is also unrealistic since it does not address the impact of
media cross-ownership and the increasing concentration of ownership. Although
operational functionalism comes closer to providing an appropriate framework
for regulation, it fails because it would remove significant speech protection
from the speaker owner and require governmental judgments on the relative
value of various types of speech activity.
Of existing regulatory models, the public forum doctrine provides the most
appropriate framework for the construction of a constitutional regulatory model
that structurally accommodates both private and public speech rights. However,
189. Katsh, supra note 29, at 663. "Computers allow each individual to make his or her ideas available
to others, to 'publish' ideas in ways that were not previously possible. The model of the future is one in
which information will be moving around the country, if not the globe, faster than ever before among
individuals and groups who could not previously communicate with each other .... [I]ndividuals ... will
be able to collect, manipulate and communicate information in new ways .... The pressures of the new
media will be to demand actual equality." Id. at 662-63.
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the doctrine must be modified to encompass new communication media and
to assure the creation and preservation of viable public forums. Inherent in the
modified doctrine must be a recognition that the threat of private censorship
is as dangerous as government censorship and should therefore be prevented.
Such a formulation of the doctrine arguably limits government power to
infringe upon the rights of speakers, but also requires the government to limit
private infringement of speech rights.
The concededly general proposals for a modified public/private forum model
set out above constitute a modest attempt to address the speech-related issues
likely to arise in the context of broadband services. This modified public/private
forum model attempts to move beyond the regulatory morass which could result
from an attempt to regulate the new communications media under the old
regulatory schemes. The model also attempts to address some of the criticisms
of the current public/private forum doctrine.
Specifically, efforts to institutionalize viable public fora and distinguish
them from private fora are aimed at preserving the existence of an inexpensive
electronic public forum alternative. When combined with government and
industry initiatives to make public fora widely accessible public utilities, efforts
at institutionalization should make the benefits of broadband technology avail-
able to the vast majority of American society.
The model also incorporates a modest attempt to address some of the
concerns raised by the anticipated provision of integrated broadband services
by vertically integrated broadband service providers.' In particular, the
model proposes that public fora exchange their access and content controls for
substantially limited business and speech liability. This proposal addresses
concerns regarding private censorship precipitated by attempts on the part of
RBOCs, on-line database providers, and cable companies to deny, control, limit,
or censor the access and use of certain classes of users.
The model also attempts to address concerns about government censorship.
Under the proposal, government determinations of access and speech entitle-
ment are premised on relatively objective, noncontent oriented, evidentiary
considerations of whether a firm possesses monopoly power or essential
facilities. The only other way an entity may be deemed a public forum is
through voluntary election of this status. Beyond determinations of forum status,
the government may only work to assure equality of access in terms of facilities
and services. This proposal incorporates the thrust of the government's current
190. The separation of a vertically integrated service provider's competitive information services from
its switching and transmission facilities which provide essential services reflects the basic philosophy of
the FCC's goals of preventing discriminatory access to telephone networks and preventing cross-subsidiza-
tion of competitive activities with monopoly profits. See People of California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1232-
33 (1990) (discussing the FCC's structural separations policy).
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open network architecture (ONA) and comparably efficient interconnections
(CEI) policies.
Finally the government may not penalize or hold a public forum provider
liable for user speech, nor may a public forum be required to exercise control
over user access or speech beyond making capacity and services available on
a non-discriminatory basis. Government or public attempts to modify a forum's
status which appear to be motivated by an intent to control or modify the
content of speech would be per se illegal.
IV. Toward a New Theory of Electronic First Amendment Regulation for
Broadband Technology
Quality thinking does not come from putting problems in stark, black
and white terms. It comes from having the flexibility, subtlety and
nuance to navigate in seas of gray.191
Interactive broadband communication networks can facilitate the realization
of individual speech rights of owners and non-owners alike. These rights are
vulnerable, however, and require adequate protection that does not come at the
expense of the speech rights of media owners or members of the public. Put
another way, neither the press mode nor the common carrier mode of regulation
should provide the sole basis for broadband communication regulation. Con-
gress should eschew the "curious judicial blindness"'92 attributed to the
courts. Rather, accommodation of both owner and public speech rights can and
must be made in an interactive broadband switched network environment.
However, in the process of making accommodations, regulators should
expand the classes of access and hence speech entitlement available through
broadcasting and limit the opportunities for private censorship found in cable
television and other subscription technologies. As mentioned above, the creation
of a regulatory model based on the private/public forum dichotomy may be an
appropriate way to balance the competing interests in personal liberty and in
greater equality in speech opportunities. Moreover, the public/private forum
dichotomy best assures the realization of broadband technology's potential
benefits.
191. Rodney A. Smolla, Legacy: A Conversation with James Madison, 77 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (1991).
192. "The problem ... is how courts have interpreted the Constitution. 'These decisions reveal a
curious judicial blindness, as if the Constitution had to be reinvented with the birth of each technology."'
Don Clark, 27th Amendment Proposed For High-Tech, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 27,1991, atCl (quoting Professor
Lawrence Tribe).
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A. Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis
Scholars and jurists have long pondered and argued about the independent
private press and government-required public access. Some, relying on the
"literal" meaning of the First Amendment, 93 the "original intent" of those
who drafted it, 94 or its underlying "functional intent,"' 9 5 have argued that
free speech is possible only in the absence of government regulation. 96 Oth-
ers, pointing to the relative differences between the exercise of speech in the
eighteenth and twentieth centuries, argue that the government must act affirma-
tively to insure the exercise of free speech given the current inequalities of
wealth and access which have been exacerbated by the advent of high cost
technology. 97 Finally, others have argued that to the extent that a state's
contract and property laws aid in determining access to the means of communi-
cation, the state is interfering with speech or somehow sanctioning it. 9 Con-
sequently, the state may have some corresponding responsibility to assure
access.
The debate regarding the meaning of the First Amendment remains insolu-
ble in the final analysis because the actual intentions of the collective authors
of the First Amendment are not apparent. What has become increasingly clear,
however, is that reliance on either an unregulated private speech right or
government-arbitrated access can leave substantial portions of the public
vulnerable to the specter of censorship. The loss of speech rights is equally
detrimental to American society, whether it stems from the abuses of the private
press exacerbated by government or market-based inequalities of wealth,
199
or from the oftimes well-meant actions of an overzealous government. What
matters is that speech may be irreparably lost.
As a matter of practical public policy, it may be advisable to curtail the
irresolvable debate over whether private speech or equal access is constitution-
ally preferable. The establishment of a regulatory scheme that allows the public
to take greater, more direct control of their speech rights and the flow of
information would be far more valuable. Such a scheme could also minimize
the twin threats of private and government abuse. At present, for a variety of
reasons mentioned above, no full-fledged scheme exists.
193. EMORD, supra note 89, at 101 (citing Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and the First Amendment
"Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1962)).
194. Id. at 102-05.
195. Id. at 119-29.
196. See id. at 126-29.
197. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1678 (1967); Ingber, supra note 92, at 201.
198. See Balkin, supra note 174, at 411-12.
199. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 36, at 94-101.
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The advent of computer augmented broadband switched networks, however,
may present American society with a new opportunity to restructure the rela-
tionship among the public, private media owners, and the government. In the
process of this restructuring, the potential for abuse by private owners and the
government may be reduced without losing the benefits of privately-exercised
speech or government-mandated public access.
1. The Root of the Problem
Under current regulatory schemes, the twin threats of private and govern-
ment censorship remain high. One source of these threats is the high cost of
access to the wire and spectrum technologies and the hierarchical nature and
social use of these technologies. Except for telephony, where federal and state
governments have sought to make public access affordable, most current
technologies require substantial amounts of capital to acquire relatively unfet-
tered access. This is because unfettered access or editorial control has often
been viewed as part of the panoply of rights which accompany ownership of
the medium.
Most current applications and uses of the technologies are, and have
historically been hierarchical or one-way: traveling from an originating point
to one or many other points.' Put another way, information flows "down
stream" from the source.2°3 Consequently, the speech rights of owners are
further enhanced by the actual nature of the technological application.
The confluence of ownership and orgination of the information flow neces-
sarily invites regulation at the source of control, the owner. The owner is the
point at which such regulation can be most efficient. This is especially true
when the source of control is the locus of the speech right as well. It is this
confluence of owner rights and government regulatory efficiencies which
creates the constitutional problem.
2. The Broadband Public/Private Alternative
Computer augmented broadband communications technology provides an
opportunity to decentralize the locus of the speech right. When the majority of
200. Electronic communications technology has evolved from point to point service (ship to shore radio
and telephony) to point to multipoint services (television, cable television and conference calling). The
signals of most microwave technologies such as broadcasting and cable television are omni-directional absent
antenna shielding, physical obstructions, and political and power limitations. Omni-directional signals are
those with the ability to reach all points in a geographical area.
201. Perhaps this is partly a function of the manner in which the technology was conceptualized. Much
of the science of communication rests on the behavior of spectrum energy sources such as electrical, radio,
micro and light waves. These energies possess similar characteristics: they are generated at a source and
emanate to other points whether in a straight line or omni-directional path.
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society is interconnected, the locus of speech potentially shifts to and resides
in every subscriber as well as in the medium owner. Consequently, a portion
of the right to speak is separated from the ownership and control of the med-
ium, thereby undermining regulatory efficiency. The government simply cannot
censor the speech of so many as easily as it can censor the speech of a
few.202
By the same token, owner-speakers of the switched broadband network may
find it difficult to program all their capacity. Consequently, economic incentives
may motivate owners to allow substantial access. Moreover, a statute absolving
owners of any liability for the speech content of those to whom they grant
access would remove a significant disincentive to allowing an unimpeded flow
of speech. 203 This development would be of critical importance. As public
access increases, the political pressure for access should diminish. As it does,
government regulation of owner speech, which carries the threat of possible
government censorship, diminishes as well. Thus, whatever scheme of regula-
tion is ultimately selected, it must allow for non-discriminatory access to the
facilities of communication and limited liability for providers of non-discrimina-
tory access.3 The public/private forum model proposed herein incorporates
these proposals.
B. The Broadband Infrastructure and the Free Market/Monopoly
Provider Continuum
As previously mentioned, a public policy debate currently rages over the
importance of a broadband network infrastructure and the means of financing
such a network.205 While there is growing agreement on the need for such
an infrastructure, 20 6 there is significant disagreement over how and by whom
the infrastructure is to be developed. Some, including at least two current
commissioners of the FCC and the former Assistant Secretary of NTIA, favor
a free market solution.c They argue that the free market solution best assures
202. See KATSH, supra note 33, at 113-19.
203. See Mitchell Kapor, Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, Sci. AM., Sept. 1991, at 162.
204. See id.
205. See supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text.
206. See Barrett, supra note 93, at 414-15; Gore, supra note 52, at 153; NTIA Infrastructure Report,
supra note 186, at 21-85.
207. See Chairman Alfred C. Sikes, Remarks before the Research Institute on Electronics and Automa-
tion, Venice Telecommunications Conference (May 15, 1991) (transcript available from author); Commis-
sioner Andrew C. Barrett, Remarks before the Northern Telecom, Inc.'s Executive Marketing Symposium
(June 19,1991) [hereinafter Barrett/Northern Telecom]; Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett, FiberTechnology
and Video Services: Regulatory Challenges for the 1990's, Remarks before the Fiber Optics 1991 Conference
sponsored by the Society of Cable Television Engineers (January 9, 1991) [hereinafter Barrett/SCTE). See
also, Lawmakers Question Setting Date for National Fiber Network, Phillips Publishing, Inc. Vol. 11, No.
27, at 1 (1991).
HeinOnline  -- 9 Yale J. on Reg. 229 1992
The Yale Journal on Regulation
the development of market disciplined businesses responding to articulated
demands for services.208
Others prefer a "public" infrastructure solution that recognizes a monopoly
provider. This solution would avoid further privatization of the public switched
network. Citing the historical precedents in telecommunications, transportation,
and electronic communications, these experts suggest that a public infrastructure
solution can yield long range economic and social benefits.' They argue that
a regulated monopoly provider is more likely to assure the realization of the
social goals of equality in the services available to the public.
The current status of the national telecommunications policy, like the
marketplace, lies somewhere in between these two extremes. In the national
long distance market, AT&T is still regulated as the carrier of last resort for
the majority of the nation's voice and data transmission needs. A number of
other privately owned "public" networks such as MCI and Sprint also provide
long distance voice services. In the local exchange market, the RBOCs are the
carriers of last resort, required by regulation to provide non-discriminatory voice
and data service. Increasingly, private networks will siphon off lucrative
portions of the customer base for local or national voice, data and video
services.2° Thus the national market already consists of a mix of regulated
"monopoly" providers and private "competitive" carrier providers. These voice
and data networks exist apart from the video distribution networks previously
mentioned.2 ' As noted earlier, all of these players are sparring over who
should be allowed to become the broadband provider to residential customers.
Some argue that the lack of a clear policy renders decision making risky
and provides opportunities for warring industry interest groups to delay the
adoption of a national policy and the implementation of an infrastructure
solution. 12 The nation may be losing the opportunity for an efficient transi-
tion to the increasingly desired infrastructure and may end up with numerous
high quality private networks and a low quality, high cost public network.21
On the other hand, selection of either the purely market-driven solution or
the regulated monopoly solution may bode ill for the realization of enhanced
public speech rights. The assumption that a free market solution alone assures
208. See Sikes, supra note 207, at 4; Barrett/Northem Telecom, supra note 207, at 1, 2.
209. See EoAN, supra note 1, at 174.
210. This phenomenon has been called the "tragedy of the common network." Large volume users,
who had encouraged new user entry onto the common network, are now leaving the network because their
sophisticated service needs are too different from those of the average user. Also, the large users create
economies of scale and cost savings which are easier to realize in user-specific arrangements rather than
in a common network environment. See, Eli M. Noam, Network Pluralism and Regulatory Pluralism, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 69-70 (Paula R. Newberg ed., 1989).
211. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
212. EGAN, supra note 1, at 165.
213. Id. at 166.
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the socially beneficial deployment of technology may be unrealistic and histori-
cally inaccurate." 4 Such policies tend to exacerbate current inequities in
wealth and education.1 5 To the extent the benefits of computer augmented
broadband technology are privatized and provided exclusively to those with
sufficient disposable income to demand and purchase new or enhanced services,
the potential for an interconnected public forum is exchanged for a host of
private ones. Under these circumstances, electronic speech rights become the
province of speaker-owners and their customers, the wealthier individuals in
our society. Those with limited property or wealth, as well as those with
unpopular or unorthodox ideas, may find the electronic exercise of their speech
rights threatened.
If the current policy stalemate results in the development of numerous
higher quality private networks responsive to high demand and a low quality-
high cost public network,216 the majority of the public is less likely to receive
access to the technological innovations necessary to facilitate the computer
augmented interactive broadband services that enhance speech rights. 217 This
result would be suboptimal for American society, for,
[a]s more and more of our communication becomes electronic, standing on
the street comer and handing out leaflets may become an increasingly
pointless means for getting an idea across .... In the world that is rushing
at us so swiftly, the minimally necessary tool will be not a photocopying
machine or a printing press, but a computer terminal or home computer
linked to the emerging electronic networks. 218
214. The history of the national, public, switched, telephone network belies the trickle down assumption
of the free market proponents. The "semi-competitive," pre-regulation phase of telephone network
development, roughly from 1893 to 1915, was characterized by economic waste, additional cost burdens
for consumers, and unsatisfactory service quality. During this phase, multiple facilities-based carriers often
competed for the more profitable business and residential customer markets, leaving less desirable markets
with little or no service.
Where service was provided in these less profitable markets, high charges denied access for many
people. These charges were often out of sync with the provider's revenue requirements for efficient
operation. In some cases they were too high even in the face of competition. In other cases they were
insufficient to provide for improvement of facilities and the extension of phone lines to new customers.
See Warren G. Lavey, The Public Policies that Changed the Telephone Industry Into Regulated Monopolies:
Lessons from Around 1915, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 171, 176-84 (1987).
215. See E;AN, supra note 1, at 176.
216. See id. at 166.
217. See generally Dertouzos, Building the Information Marketplace, supra note 52. Michael Dertouzos
has suggested that a fully developed broadband infrastructure would possess three main characteristics:
flexible transport capabilities, common communications conventions, and common servers.
The concept of flexible transport addresses the elements of speed, reliability, and security of transmis-
sion. Common communications conventions would include common, uniform terms and forms as well as
software for transacting a variety of communications activities over the infrastructure. Finally, common
servers are conceived as basic information services available at all times to all who are interconnected to
the infrastructure.
218. Carter, supra note 35, at 599.
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Currently, the public infrastructure solution would seem to hold significant
promise for facilitating the equitable distribution of the potential benefits of
computer augmented broadband communications services to the American
public.219 It holds better promise for providing universal access,22° facilitat-
ing the cooperative ventures necessary to develop common standards,22' and
minimizing the extent and effects of privatization of the network infrastruc-
ture.222 This solution, however, is fraught with other problems. A public infra-
structure solution could constrain the development of new product and service
options that a purely competitive market would likely provide. Moreover, to
the extent that the regulated local exchange companies are allowed to compete
for the provision of information services, some concerns regarding anti-competi-
tive activities and cross-subsidization may become a reality.223 If RBOC com-
petition produces this kind of behavior, the result could be significant limita-
tions on user speech.
Thus, selection of the public infrastructure solution may, in time, bring us
full circle to the concerns which led to the break-up of AT&T not so long ago.
Ultimately, the arguments that government regulation of such monopoly
providers would be inefficient in assuring the delivery of innovative services
responsive to consumer demand and ineffective in controlling the exercise of
monopoly power in the current partially competitive environment, retain
significant merit.2" Moreover, a pure regulated monopoly approach would
tend to approach the traditional common carrier regulatory solution, depriving
transmission providers of speech rights.
The alternative scenario which combines features of the public infrastructure
and free market alternatives may be the least objectionable solution. In principal
this hybrid model is certainly the most politically expedient solution given the
realities of the current marketplace. In order to be viable, however the solution
should incorporate a number of government, industry, and consumer-sponsored
initiatives to stimulate the development of a minimally supportive national
broadband infrastructure. There is growing agreement that such a solution
should incorporate proposed initiatives including the adoption of a national
policy favoring universal service and access; 2 5 national interconnection and
equipment standards; 26 and flexible transport, common communication con-
219. See EGAN, supra note 1, at 174-75.
220. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
221. See Dertouzos, Building the Information Marketplace, supra note 52, at 38.
222. See id. at 39.
223. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
224. See Barrett, supra note 93, at 426-27. See also NTIA Infrastructure Report, supra note 186.
225. See NTIA Infrastructure Report, supra note 186; Barrett,'supra note 93, at 420-23; Dertouzos,
Communications, Computers and Networks, supra note 52, at 65-67; Lavey, supra note 214, at 187-89.
226. See Dertouzous, Communications, Computers, and Networks, supra note 52, at 65-67; NTIA
Infrastructure Report, supra note 186, at 132.
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ventions and common servers.227 The creation and maintenance of viable,
accessible public fora should also be added to this list.
Finally, the call for relatively unfettered competition between firms at the
local loop and national transmission and switching levels is understandably
desirable. Nevertheless, proponents of the public infrastructure (regulated
monopoly) solution are right in emphasizing that more desirable social (as
opposed to economic) benefits are likely to accrue from implementation of that
solution. One way to achieve some measure of the benefits of the public
infrastructure approach is to develop government incentives to encourage the
large regulated phone companies to build substantial portions of the intercon-
nected broadband infrastructure and work with users in developing access and
utility protocols. Recent court decisions and the recommendations of NTIA are
moving in this direction." Other firms such as the long distance phone com-
panies and cable television firms should also be encouraged to enter the market.
Market forces would then generate a variety of information services.2 9 In this
way, the public infrastructure solution would shape the development and use
of broadband technology and assure the benefits of access, usage and intercon-
nection. Adoption of this policy agenda would reduce a significant portion of
the risk which attends current efforts to plan investment and competitive entry
strategies. This governmental policy would also facilitate the realization of the
benefits associated with responsive product and service innovation.
C. Infrastructure, Access, and Speech
The broad parameters of the nation's broadband infrastructure policy will
emerge within the next few years. In this time frame, the appeals and legislative
initiatives230 of opponents to RBOC entry into the information services
markets most likely will have been completed and/or resolved. The FCC, the
Congress and the public will have responded to the NTIA's Infrastructure
Report. The FCC will have issued its findings on removal of the telco-cable
227. See Dertouzous, Communications, Computers, and Networks, supra note 52, at 65-67.
228. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
229. See Lavey, supra note 214, at 187.
230. The American Newspaper Publishers Association is supporting legislation recently introduced by
Congressman Jim Cooper, D-Tenn. The bill would prohibit an RBOC from providing electronic publishing
services within its local market unless: a) 50% of the residences and businesses have access to an alternative
local carrier which offers comparable services on a price, quality and geographic basis; b) 10% or more
of the residences and businesses subscribe to the alternative carrier; and c) the RBOC establishes that it
lacks sufficient market power to impede competition. See 137 CONG. REC. E3308 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1991)
(statement by Congressman Jim Cooper); Cooper Bill Sets Baby Bell 'Bottle-neck' Test, NAT'L J. CONG.
DALLY, Telecommunications Section, Oct. 8, 1991. See also Henry Gilgoff, For Whom the Bells Toll; Ruling
Could Be a Boon for Baby Bells, Curse for Papers, NEWSDAY, July 28, 1991, at 3.
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cross-ownership rules23' and reconciled its open network architecture and
structural separations policies with the Ninth Circuit's Computer III opin-
ion.23 Congress will have amended the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 and either passed infrastructure legislation or deferred the hard deci-
sions for judgment by the FCC.
It is still too early to suggest the results of these determinations. Regardless
of the precise economic and public service features of the policy resolution,
however, the resolution must allow for government exercise of its obligation
to make some minimum level of interactive broadband communications avail-
able to all potential participants in the system, whether they be media owners
or users, speakers or receivers. Moreover, the mechanism for government
intervention must be minimally intrusive. Current proposed legislation, as well
as FCC and NTIA pronouncements, address the need for a national infrastruc-
ture and even acknowledge the necessity to make the infrastructure accessible
to research groups, educational institutions, small businesses, and the public.
However, current proposals do not address the constitutional status to be
accorded the national broadband infrastructure, or the need to assure and protect
the speech rights of all providers and users seeking access to the infrastructure.
As argued earlier, these omissions constitute a major policy blind spot in the
government's infrastructure debates and policy formulation.
Given the potential speech benefits which can accrue to American society
through the creation and universal availability of the broadband network, the
Congress, the NTIA, and the FCC must facilitate debate and comment on the
scope of the speech rights to be allocated to broadband providers and users.
Moreover, legislative and regulatory policies must incorporate and protect the
speech rights of broadband providers and users.
At a minimum, the broadband infrastructure legislation and policies should
recognize that both the private owner of transmission facilities and the public
have constitutionally discernable and legitimate First Amendment speech rights.
The pronouncements should also acknowledge that current regulatory schemes
are incapable of adequately protecting public and private speech rights.
. Owner and user speech rights may be protected by resort to a public/private
forum regulatory scheme which incorporates a number of regulatory elements
of existing models. The FCC should designate a broadband provider as a public
forum when it possesses monopoly power via economic, physical, or natural
means or via essential facilities. A public forum may also be deemed to exist
where private owners choose to hold their media of communication open to the
231. Telephone companies are prohibited from owning cable television systems in their local markets.
See 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988) and 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-63.58 (1990). NTIA has argued that the restrictions
should be Lifted. See NTIA Infrastructure Report supra note 186, at 211.
232. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
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public. In order to protect against private censorship whether for economic or
other reasons, public forum broadband providers should exercise their speech
rights through separate subsidiaries. These subsidiaries should not receive
interconnections or transmission or switching services which are superior to
those provided to other comparable speakers.
Thus, where the private owner possesses essential or monopoly facilities
which a substantial portion of the public must use (for example, the public
switched network), the government would be able to legislate some form of
structural public access in exchange for reducing the owner's liability for
transmission and user speech. The government would be authorized to preserve
the "public" and "open" nature of the facilities. The owner would also have
rights of access and speech. Neither the government nor the public would be
allowed to regulate on the basis of content.
Under such a regulatory scheme, the non-owning public gains access to the
larger telecommunications infrastructure while speaker-owners retain a right
of speech circumscribed only when they possess monopoly power or essential
facilities. This scheme is arguably consistent with the current thrust of public
policy and technological development. It is also flexible enough to accommo-
date future changes in policy, technology and industry structure as they occur.
The list of potential opportunities, benefits and expectations appended to
the much anticipated national broadband infrastructure is extensive, far reach-
ing, and daunting. Yet, current Congressional legislation and the raging national
debate neglect the question of how this new infrastructure can or might be used
to define, extend, or enhance the speech rights of the facilities and network
providers, the service providers, and the public users.
Congress, through hearings and legislation, is intent upon providing the FCC
and the courts with direction concerning the scope of national communications
policy in the twenty-first century. In the process it should also articulate its
vision of how this national technological and economic treasure should affect
the speech rights of American citizens and institutions. If our representatives
do not address the evolution of our collective speech rights at this juncture, it
is possible that these rights may not be addressed at all. It would be ironic if
during the debate over the critical role of the infrastructure, we as a nation
failed to confront its potential effect on one of our most cherished and funda-
mental rights.
Although our attention may be directed to the risks posed by European and
Japanese competitors abroad and to the spirited clash of interest groups at
home, we must not lose sight of the potential to expand speech opportunities
through new technology.
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